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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 According to sources writing during the late Republic, Roman dictators exercised 
supreme authority over all other magistrates in the Roman polity for the duration of their term.  
Modern scholars have followed this traditional paradigm.  A close reading of narratives 
describing early dictatorships and an analysis of ancient epigraphic evidence, however, reveal 
inconsistencies in the traditional model.   
The purpose of this thesis is to introduce a new model of the early Roman dictatorship 
that is based upon a reexamination of the evidence for the nature of dictatorial imperium and the 
relationship between consuls and dictators in the period 501-300 BC.  Originally, dictators 
functioned as ad hoc magistrates, were equipped with standard consular imperium, and, above all, 
were intended to supplement consuls.  Furthermore, I demonstrate that Sulla’s dictatorship, a 
new and genuinely absolute form of the office introduced in the 80s BC, inspired subsequent late 
Republican perceptions of an autocratic dictatorship. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 327 B.C., the Romans engaged in conflict with the Samnites over control of the city of 
Neapolis in Campania.1  This event ignited the Second Samnite War, which lasted until 304.  
This war strained the magisterial structure of the Roman polity more than any conflict in its 
history up to that point.  The Romans confronted this challenge by employing the office of 
dictator.  In fact, during the twenty-three-year conflict, the consular fasti, annual lists of 
magistrates recorded from the beginning of the Republic, register seventeen dictatorships for 
both military and civic functions.  The fasti and ancient literary sources describing the conflict 
agree that these dictators served either as supplementary military commanders or as consular 
replacements for tasks within the city of Rome itself.  A close reading of the literary sources, 
moreover, reveals that none of these dictators wielded imperium superior to that of the sitting 
consuls.  The frequent occurrence of dictatorships in the Second Samnite War runs directly into 
conflict with traditional characterizations of the office but is, as I shall argue in this thesis, 
indicative of Roman use of the dictatorship during the early Republic. 
 The traditional view of the Roman dictatorship holds that dictators were granted 
unrestricted imperium and administered the Roman polity autonomously for a period of up to six 
months.  This version of the dictatorship also emphasizes the seriousness of the office and, 
therefore, that its use was to be guarded.  Three ancient descriptions of the institution are 
indicative of the traditional view.  Polybius, whose brief mention of the dictatorship is the 
earliest extant literary analysis of the office, characterizes a dictator of the Second Punic War in 
this way (3.87.6-9): 
                                                 
1.  All dates are B.C., unless otherwise noted.  
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Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ δικτάτορα μὲν κατέστησαν Κόιντον Φάβιον...ὁ δὲ δικτάτωρ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν 
ὑπάτων· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπάτων ἑκατέρῳ δώδεκα πελέκεις ἀκολουθοῦσι, τούτῳ δ’ εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρες, 
κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς προσδέονται τῆς συγκλήτου πρὸς τὸ συντελεῖν τὰς ἐπιβολάς, οὗτος δ’ ἔστιν 
αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός, οὗ κατασταθέντος παραχρῆμα διαλύεσθαι συμβαίνει πάσας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν τῇ 
Ῥώμῃ πλὴν τῶν δημάρχων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις ἀκριβεστέραν ποιησόμεθα τὴν 
διαστολήν. 
  
The Romans appointed Quintus Fabius dictator...The dictator has these distinctions from the consuls: 
twelve lictors accompany each of the consuls, but twenty-four accompany the dictator; the consuls 
(κἀκεῖνοι) are very much bound to the senate in making decisions, but the dictator (οὗτος) is an 
autonomous commander, and when he is appointed, it happens immediately that all magistracies in Rome 
except the plebeian tribunate are dissolved. Nevertheless, I shall give more precise details about these 
things at another time.2 
 
I shall discuss this passage in detail in the final chapter of the thesis.  Livy, recording the first 
dictatorial appointment in 501, characterizes the dictatorship this way (2.18.4-8): 
in hac tantarum expectatione rerum sollicita ciuitate, dictatoris primum creandi mentio orta. sed nec 
quibus consulibus quia ex factione Tarquiniana essent – id quoque enim traditur – parum creditum sit, nec 
quis primum dictator creatus sit, satis constat. apud ueterrimos tamen auctores T. Larcium dictatorem 
primum, Sp. Cassium magistrum equitum creatos inuenio. consulares legere; ita lex iubebat de dictatore 
creando lata. eo magis adducor ut credam Larcium, qui consularis erat, potius quam M’. Valerium Marci 
filium Volesi nepotem, qui nondum consul fuerat, moderatorem et magistrum consulibus appositum. 
 ...creato dictatore primum Romae, postquam praeferri secures uiderunt, magnus plebem metus incessit, ut 
intentiores essent ad dicto parendum; neque enim ut in consulibus qui pari potestate essent, alterius 
auxilium neque prouocatio erat neque ullum usquam nisi in cura parendi auxilium.3 
 
When the city was shaken in the expectation of such threats, the mention of creating a dictator arose for the 
first time. But it is not well understood which consuls were trusted too little, because of their association 
with the Tarquins – for this also is handed down – or who was made the first dictator. Nevertheless, in the 
most ancient sources I find that T. Larcius was appointed as the first dictator, and Sp. Cassius as magister 
equitum. They selected men of consular rank, since a law about creating dictators was passed in this in such 
a way. I am led more to believe that Larcius, who was of consular rank, rather than M’. Valerius, son of 
Marcus and grandson of Volesius, who had not yet been a consul, was appointed as a magistrate to direct 
the consuls...After a dictator was created at Rome for first time, a great fear fell upon the plebeians as soon 
as they saw the fasces being carried in front of [the dictator], with the result that they were more intent 
upon obeying his orders. For, unlike when there were consuls, who were equal in their authority, there was 
no intervention (auxilium) from the other colleague (alterius), nor was there the right of provocatio, nor 
any other assistance at any time beyond obedience. 
 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus offers the following assessment of the first dictatorial appointment 
(Ant. Rom. 5.73.1-2): 
οὗτος πρῶτος ἐν Ῥώμῃ μόναρχος ἀπεδείχθη πολέμου τε καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ παντὸς ἄλλου πράγματος 
αὐτοκράτωρ. ὄνομα δ’ αὐτῷ τίθενται δικτάτορα, εἴτε διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ κελεύειν, ὅτι θέλοι, καὶ 
τάττειν τὰ δίκαιά τε καὶ τὰ καλὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιτάγματα καὶ τὰς διαγραφὰς 
                                                 
2.  Translations throughout are my own. 
3.  Some MSS record the name of the first dictator as T. Largius, but I follow Ogilvie 1965: 281-283, who 
reads T. Larcius.  See also Broughton 1951a: 10 n. 2. 
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τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων ἠδίκτα οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι καλοῦσιν· εἴτε ὥς τινες γράφουσι διὰ τὴν τότε γενομένην 
ἀνάρρησιν, ἐπειδὴ οὐ παρὰ τοῦ δήμου τὴν ἀρχὴν εὑρόμενος κατὰ τοὺς πατρίους ἐθισμοὺς ἕξειν ἔμελλεν, 
ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ ἀνδρὸς ἀποδειχθεὶς ἑνός. οὐ γὰρ ᾤοντο δεῖν ἐπίφθονον ὄνομα καὶ βαρὺ θέσθαι τινὶ ἀρχῇ πόλιν 
ἐλευθέραν ἐπιτροπευούσῃ, τῶν τε ἀρχομένων ἕνεκα, ἵνα μηθὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς μισουμέναις προσηγορίαις 
ἐκταράττωνται, καὶ τῶν παραλαμβανόντων τὰς ἀρχὰς προνοίᾳ, μή τι λάθωσιν ἢ παθόντες ὑφ’ ἑτέρων 
πλημμελὲς ἢ δράσαντες αὐτοὶ τοὺς πέλας, ὧν φέρουσιν αἱ τοιαῦται δυναστεῖαι· ἐπεὶ τό γε τῆς ἐξουσίας 
μέγεθος, ἧς ὁ δικτάτωρ ἔχει, ἥκιστα δηλοῦται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος· ἔστι γὰρ αἱρετὴ τυραννὶς ἡ δικτατορία. 
 
[Larcius] was appointed as the first absolute ruler in Rome, an autonomous magistrate in war, in peace, and 
in every other matter. They applied the name dictator to him, either on account of his authority in giving 
orders as he wishes and the fact that he does things justly and honorable as would best to him – for, the 
Romans call commands and decrees of both just and unjust things ‘edicts’ – or, as many write, on account 
of the appointment then introduced, since he was to receive the office not by obtaining it from the people, 
according to ancestral custom, but from appointment by a single man. For, they did not think it necessary to 
give an invidious and severe name to an office that would rule a free city on account of those being ruled, 
so that they would not be agitated by despised titles, and those taking up the magistracy with foresight, so 
that they neither unknowingly suffer something outrageous from others nor themselves wrong those around 
them, which things such absolute positions allow. Moreover, the greatness of the power which the dictator 
possesses is shown least of all by the name; for, the dictatorship is a tyranny that can be taken up. 
 
 These passages comprise the canonized model of the Republican dictatorship as an 
extraordinary magistracy with an unrestricted jurisdiction.  This traditional paradigm has also 
governed modern analyses of the dictatorship ever since.  A brief glance at the work of four 
scholars from different periods is indicative of conventional perceptions of the dictatorship.  
Mommsen (1887), one of the first scholars to examine the office in depth, followed the 
traditional model closely.4  His discussion of the relationship of dictators to consuls and praetors 
includes this summation5: 
Seiner Amtsgewalt nach ist der Dictator im Allgemeinen aufzufassen als ausserordentlich eintretender 
College der Consuln und Prätoren. Derselbe Amtsname praetor wird in ältester Zeit auf alle drei 
Kategorien gleichmässig bezogen. Die Insignien des Amts sind durchaus die gleichen, nur dass Zahl der 
Lictoren nicht dieselbe ist. Ganz mit demselben Recht, wie der Prätor mit der Hälfte der consularischen 
Fasces collega consulum heisst atque iisdem auspiciis creatus, kann auch der Dictator mit der doppelten 
Anzahl von Lictoren so genannt werden. Die unter diesen dreien der königlichen unmittelbar nachgebild-
ete Gewalt ist die consularische, die darum auch in der Zahl der Lictoren der königlichen gleichgesetzt wird; 
die Fasces wurden bei dem Prätor gehälftet, bei dem Dictator verdoppelt, um damit greifbar 
auszudrücken, dass, wie dem Prätor eine der des Consuls gleichartige, aber schwächere, so dem Dictator 
eine der des Consuls gleichartige, aber stärkere Gewalt (maius imperium) zukommt. Ausdrücklich 
gesagt wird es allerdings in unserer Ueberlieferung nicht, dass der Dictator College der Consul sei...Die 
sogenannte Dictatur ist also eigentlich die Anordnung, dass bei Abschaffung der lebeslänglichen 
Monarchie den neuen Jahrherrschern gestattet ward nach Ermessen einen dritten Collegen hinzuzunehmen, 
hinsichtlich dessen das Volk vorher nicht zu befragen, der aber an Macht ihnen beiden überlegen war.6 
                                                 
4.  Full discussion of the dictatorship at Mommsen 1887: 2.141-172. 
5.  This passage is quoted from Mommsen 1887: 2.153-154.  
6.  Phrases in bold font in this and subsequent quotations from modern authors indicate my emphases.  
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In accordance with the power of his office, a dictator is generally considered to be an additional 
extraordinary colleague of the consuls and praetors. The same office-name of praetor is conferred equally 
on all three offices in the early period. The insignia of the office are very much the same, except for the 
number of lictors. While having equal powers, just as a praetor with half the number of consular fasces is 
said to be collega consulum atque iisdem auspiciis creatus [created as a colleague of the consuls and under 
the same type of auspices], the dictator can also be referred to in the same way, although having double the 
number of lictors. Among these three the regal power is directly reproduced as consular, which is made 
equal even in the number of lictors: there are half the fasces for a praetor and double for a dictator, meant 
to express tangibly that, just as a praetor has lesser authority than the consuls, so, too, a dictator has 
equivalent but greater authority (maius imperium) than the consuls. It is, however, clearly not stated in 
our sources that the dictator is a colleague of the consuls...The so-called dictator is thus actually a 
formation that, with the abolishment of a monarchy that lasts for life, was established for adding to annual 
senior magistrates a third colleague, as needed, about whom the people would not be asked beforehand, but 
who was superior in power to [the other two colleagues]. 
 
Loewenstein (1973), a political scientist examining the administration of the Roman Republic, 
characterizes the position of the dictatorship in this way: 
The political power connected with the dictatorship consisted – positively – in the all-embracing 
character of his imperium –, negatively – in his exemption from the intercession of any and all other 
magistrates, whether a consul or a tribune. Since there existed no coequal colleague, the power was 
monolithic in the fullest sense of the term.7 
 
while Cornell (1995) writes this of the dictatorship: 
In cases of emergency a dictator was appointed...to act as supreme commander and head of state. The 
dictator himself appointed a Master of the Horse (magister equitum). This, together with the fact that an 
alternative name for the dictator was magister populi (probably, commander of the army), indicates that his 
primary function was to act as a military commander. The consuls remained in office, but were subject 
to the dictator’s authority, against which there was no appeal.8 
 
Finally, Lintott (1999), a leading scholar in the study of the Roman constitution, offers this 
assessment: 
The dictatorship seems to have been conceived as a short-term magistracy with special powers, which 
could be created with the minimum of delay, since the man was simply nominated, not elected. ...The 
supremacy of the dictator was manifested by 24 fasces – though perhaps only 12 were normally 
displayed in the city...How absolute the power of the dictator was, seems to have been an issue which was 
determined not by statute or by any clear rule, but by casuistry, and it remained debatable at the time when 
the annalistic tradition was being developed in the last two centuries of the Republic.9 
 
All of these characterizations – ancient and modern – stress the supremacy of the 
dictator’s position in the Roman polity.  Within the framework of this traditional model of the 
                                                 
7.  Loewenstein 1973: 78.  See pp. 75-88 for a full analysis of the dictatorship.  
8.  Cornell 2001: 226-227.  
9.  Lintott 1999: 110-112. 
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dictatorship, there are references that imply that ancient commentators noticed inconsistencies.  
This is most evident on the subject of consular versus dictatorial imperium.  Polybius describes 
the dictator as an αὐτοκράτωρ and claims that dictatorial imperium was unrestricted (3.87.7-9).  
His portrayal of consular imperium evokes his description of the power wielded by dictators: he 
notes that consular authority was nearly supreme (σχεδὸν αὐτοκράτορα τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχουσι, 
they have authority approximate to an autonomous magistrate, 6.12.5) and remarks that anyone 
viewing the consulship would think it a monarchy (ὥστ’ εἰκότως εἰπεῖν ἄν...διότι μοναρχικὸν 
ἁπλῶς καὶ βασιλικόν ἐστι τὸ πολίτευμα, the result is that one would reasonably say...that it 
was simply a monarchical or sovereign state, 6.12.9).  Cicero’s definitions of dictatorial and 
consular imperium are similarly ambiguous.  He clearly views the two forms of imperium as 
equal, with the only distinction being his notion that a dictator held imperium with no colleague.  
Cicero maintains that the Romans assigned to dictators a new form of authority: novumque id 
genus imperii visum est et proximum similitudini regiae (That new form of imperium seemed to 
be very much like royal authority, Rep. 2.56).  His summary of the nature of consular imperium 
is quite similar: atque uti consules potestatem haberent tempore dumtaxat annuam, genere ipso 
ac iure regiam (and the consuls at that time had not more than annual power, but power that was 
regal in its very form and jurisdiction, Rep. 2.56).  In both cases, the authors appear to be 
engaging the idea of parity between consular and dictatorial imperium.   
Ancient etymological discussions on the precise meaning of the title dictator point to 
further inconsistencies within traditional ancient views of dictatorial supremacy.  Modern 
linguistic analysis reveals that the term dictator is a properly formed de-verbal agentive noun.  
This formation, according to the entry for dictator in OLD, is comprised of the fourth principal 
part of a verb, here, dictat- from dictare, plus the –or agentive ending; the –or suffix conveys an 
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active meaning.10  Ernout and Meillet and Vaan, however, suggest that the noun dictator 
predated the verb dictare.11  Even so, the root of the word is related to the verb dicere, and based 
upon the proper formation of this type of agentive noun, dictator should denote ‘the one who 
gives orders.’ 
  Ancient authors noted confusion about the formation of this noun.  Varro gives this 
etymology for dictator: dictator, quod a consule dicebatur, cui dicto audientes omnes essent 
(The dictator, so called because he was accustomed to be named by a consul, is the one whose 
commands everyone obeys, LL 5.82).  In this single sentence, Varro offers two explanations.  
First, he implies that the meaning of dictator comes from the fact that consuls appointed them.  
Second, he tells us that all Romans were obliged to obey the dictator’s orders.  He adds a less 
ambiguous entry at LL 6.61: hinc dictator magister populi, quod is a consule debet dici 
(Therefore, the magister populi is called dictator because he must be named by a consul).  
Dionysius’ etymology, contained in the passage quoted above, is equally unresolved (Ant. Rom. 
5.73.1): 
ὄνομα δ’ αὐτῷ τίθενται δικτάτορα, εἴτε διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ κελεύειν, ὅτι θέλοι, καὶ τάττειν τὰ δίκαιά 
τε καὶ τὰ καλὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιτάγματα καὶ τὰς διαγραφὰς τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ 
ἀδίκων ἠδίκτα οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι καλοῦσιν· εἴτε ὥς τινες γράφουσι διὰ τὴν τότε γενομένην ἀνάρρησιν, ἐπειδὴ 
οὐ παρὰ τοῦ δήμου τὴν ἀρχὴν εὑρόμενος κατὰ τοὺς πατρίους ἐθισμοὺς ἕξειν ἔμελλεν, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ ἀνδρὸς 
ἀποδειχθεὶς ἑνός. 
 
They applied the name dictator to him, either on account of his authority in giving orders as he wishes and 
the fact that he does things justly and honorably as would seem best to him – for, the Romans call 
commands and decrees of both just and unjust things ‘edicts’ – or, as many write, on account of the 
appointment then introduced, since he was to receive the office not by obtaining it from the people, 
according to ancestral custom, but from appointment by a single man. 
 
                                                 
10.  OLD: 538 notes that dictator is from the verb dictare, a frequentative form of dicere.  The Latin 
language contains a number of similarly formed de-verbal agentive nouns, such as actor (from ago, agere, egi, actus) 
and scriptor (from scribo, scribere, scripsi, scriptus). 
11.  Maltby 1991: 186-187; Vaan 2008: 169-170.  Ernout and Meillet 1985: 174 write: Le sens général de 
la racine était « montrer ».  Mais on voit par gr. δίκη et par la forme germanique qu’elle a servi à désigner des actes 
sociaux de caractére juridique.  Et c’est ainsi qu’elle est parvenue au sens de « dire ».  L'usage de la racine pour 
désigner une déclaration en forme s'est prolongé en latin, où un dérivé aussi évidemment récent que dictator a fourni 
le nom d'un magistrat. 
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Just like Varro, Dionysius records alternative explanations for the meaning of the title dictator, 
one emphasizing the dictator’s authority and the other the procedure of appointment.  Plutarch’s 
account follows Varro and Dionysius.  He writes the following about the etymology of dictator 
(Marc. 24.12): 
ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπάτων τις ἢ τῶν στρατηγῶν προελθὼν εἰς τὸν δῆμον ὃν αὐτῷ δοκεῖ λέγει δικτάτορα. καὶ διὰ 
τοῦτο δικτάτωρ ὁ ῥηθεὶς καλεῖται· τὸ γὰρ λέγειν δίκερε Ῥωμαῖοι καλοῦσιν· ἔνιοι δέ <φασι> τὸν 
δικτάτορα τῷ μὴ προτιθέναι ψῆφον ἢ χειροτονίαν, ἀλλ’ ἀφ’ αὑτοῦ τὰ δόξαντα προστάττειν καὶ λέγειν 
οὕτως ὠνομάσθαι· 
 
But one of the consuls or generals approaches the people and names as dictator whom he sees fit. It is 
because of this that he, after being named, is called dictator; for, the Romans say ‘to name’ as dicere. 
Others say that the dictator is so named because he does not set up voting procedures but proclaims and 
carries out what seems best to him. 
 
Plutarch’s word-choice of λέγει δικτάτορα and direct reference to the Latin verb dicere (δίκερε) 
recall the Latin phrase dictatorem dicere that was thought by other ancient commentators to have 
given the dictator his title.  Finally, even Cicero, a contemporary of Varro, is undecided about the 
meaning of dictator (Rep. 1.63)12:  
gravioribus vero bellis etiam sine collega omne imperium nostri penes singulos esse voluerunt, quorum 
ipsum nomen vim suae potestatis indicat. nam dictator quidem ab eo appellatur, quia dicitur, sed in nostris 
libris vides eum, Laeli, magistrum populi appellari. 
 
But in more serious wars our [people] wanted all authority to lie with an individual man without a 
colleague, whose name is indicative of his power. For, he is called dictator because he is appointed, but in 
the augural books, Laelius, you see him named as magister populi. 
 
Cicero’s access to the augural books (nostri libri) implies that his account was more likely to 
meet with popular conceptions.  Even so, his introductory sentence on the meaning of dictator 
suggests that his etymology will confirm notions of dictatorial supremacy.  His explanation, 
however, emphasizes the fact that dictators derived their title from the manner of their 
appointment, that is, the dictator is named.   
Each of these ancient etymologies on the meaning of dictator requires an incorrect noun 
                                                 
12.  Zetzel 1995: 150. 
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formation.  Nevertheless, these ancient etymologies are important not so much for their accuracy 
as for what they reveal about Roman perceptions of the dictatorship.  The two derivations of the 
name have opposite meanings: ‘the one who is named’ and ‘the one who gives orders.’  The 
former etymology, although incorrect, contains no reference to dictatorial supremacy and thus 
undercuts traditional views of the office.  The fact that we hear of this alternative meaning in 
four accounts may indicate a separate tradition in antiquity.  Following this false etymology, the 
dictator’s very name came from the fact that he was appointed for specific, and I argue ad hoc, 
duties.  Such a denotation makes perfect sense with Roman use of the dictatorship in the early 
Republic. 
Finally, some recent scholars have noted Roman use of the dictatorship for tasks that did 
not require unrestricted authority, such as holding elections or managing religious functions.  
Loewenstein, for example, notes the variety of these tasks and suggests, ‘It is idle to speculate 
why the Romans resorted to so ponderous a device [i.e., the dictatorship] for secondary 
purposes.’13  Similarly, Brennan identifies the shift away from use of the dictatorship following 
the Second Samnite War, speculating that the senate may have grown weary of using an 
‘emergency institution’ in place of regular magistracies.14  As implied by these examples, my 
analysis of scholarship on the dictatorship has yet to uncover a satisfactory explanation of why 
the Romans used dictators in a way so inconsistent with the traditional model.  Keyes, 
approaching this question in a short article on the relationship of consular and dictatorial 
imperium, goes only so far as to suggest that in the Second Punic War, dictators might have 
allowed consuls to retain their imperium and exercise independent commands.15  Even this idea, 
however, presupposes dictatorial supremacy over the consuls. 
                                                 
13.  Loewenstein 1973: 80.  
14.  Brennan 2000a: 75. 
15.  Keyes 1917: 298-305.  
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 My purpose in this thesis is to introduce a new model of the Roman dictatorship.  This 
model is based upon the form of the office used in the early Republic, and I will reconcile its use 
with the inconsistencies noted above.  Contrary to traditional perceptions, I argue that the 
dictatorship existed in an original form, used primarily in the period 501-300, and a post-Sullan 
form.  I seek to demonstrate that according to this original version of the office, dictators were 
equipped with consular imperium, served as colleagues of the consuls, and were implemented on 
a provisional basis for consular military or civic functions.  I argue, moreover, that accounts of 
all-powerful dictators presented by authors of the late Republic were influenced directly by Sulla, 
who introduced a different and truly unrestricted form of the dictatorship onto the Roman 
political scene in 82.  Late Republican commentators, writing in the aftermath of Sulla’s regime, 
were so influenced by him that they viewed all Republican dictatorships with a priori 
assumptions of dictatorial supremacy and thus erroneously applied the post-Sullan form of the 
office to all dictatorships from the Republican period. 
 
Methodology 
My approach for this study focuses on defining the nature of dictatorial imperium and 
identifying the form and function of the original version of the office.  I begin in Chapter Two by 
examining how the dictatorship was used in other Italic republics.  Elsewhere in Latium, 
dictators served as regular annual magistrates or were appointed for provisional tasks, but the 
evidence shows that none of these Latin dictators should be considered a supremely powerful 
ruler.  These Latin dictatorships find parallels in Roman dictatorial use.  Moreover, this survey of 
the dictatorship outside the Roman polity introduces three examples of Roman sources referring 
to Carthaginian dictatores, magistrates who apparently functioned as field commanders.  These 
external uses of the dictatorship provide a secure historical precedent for my proposal that the 
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Roman dictatorship existed in an original form that was not superior to the consulship. 
Chapter Three explores the two fundamental elements that made up a Roman 
magistrate’s authority: auspicia and imperium.  I collect evidence for consuls and dictators 
engaging in the same procedures and being subject to the same restrictions in terms of their 
imperium and access to public auspicia.  The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate parity between 
consular and dictatorial auspicia and imperium and, therefore, to argue that the two offices were 
equivalent. 
In Chapter Four, I build upon the model of the dictatorship constructed in the previous 
two chapters by identifying a series of key dictatorships from the period 501-300 that explicate 
the original version of the office in Rome.  These examples encompass dictators implemented for 
both military and civic functions and demonstrate not only that the dictatorship was equivalent to 
the consulship, but also that these dictatorships were used only because the sitting consuls were 
otherwise engaged and unable to fulfill consular functions.  
 I conclude my study in Chapter Five by analyzing the end of use of the original form of 
the dictatorship, an analysis that reaches into dictatorial usage in the third century.  The gradual 
disappearance of the dictatorship was the result, at least in part, of the development of the 
praetorship, an office that eventually supplanted many dictatorial competences.  Also in this final 
chapter, I seek to trace the influences behind late Republican views that the dictatorship was an 
all-powerful magistracy.  I demonstrate that Sulla’s version of the office was responsible for 
these mistaken views. 
 
Sources 
 The greatest challenges to the study of Roman magistracy in the early Republic are lack 
of contemporary sources and the question of the reliability of information recorded in later 
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literary sources.  Moreover, reconstructions of a particular office often must be made from 
disparate pieces of information scattered across various sources.  This problem is certainly 
evident in an analysis of the early Roman dictatorship.  Even so, good evidence can be collected.  
In this thesis, I deploy a variety of source materials in an effort to arrive at the clearest picture 
possible of the early dictatorship.  The earliest literary accounts on Roman magistracy date to the 
final decades of the third century, the period both when Romans began writing down their 
history and when the original form of the dictatorship lapsed.16  The few surviving fragments of 
these early literary works are preserved in later authors.  For the period before the late third 
century, we must rely primarily on three sources: the annales maximi, consular and triumphal 
fasti, and records of elite Roman families.  The annales maximi, annual lists kept by the pontifex 
maximus, recorded the names of magistrates and important military, legislative, and religious 
events.  These books do not survive but traces of their information are to be found in later 
literary sources.  Cicero mentions these books in Rep. 1.25, and in De or. 2.52 he suggests that 
they provided the basic structure for the Roman annalistic tradition.17  Similarly, Cicero refers to 
the presence of the dictatorship itself in another set of ancient books, the augural books (Rep. 
1.63: in nostris libris).  The apparent antiquity of these books is indicated by his explanation that 
the dictatorship was registered in them with its archaic name, magister populi.18  While scholars 
disagree about how much information from the early Republic has been preserved in the annales 
maximi, most agree that it provided basic information and a framework to later Roman annalistic 
historians.  Cornell, a strong proponent of the veracity of the basic information contained in these 
                                                 
16.  The final dictatorship before Sulla occurred in 202.  For a discussion of Roman historiography, see 
Cornell 2001: 1-26; Forsythe 2005: 59-80; Beck 2007: 259-265; Levene 2007: 275-289; Wiseman 2007: 67-75.  See 
Ogilvie 1965: 5-17 for a discussion on Livy’s literary sources, and for a thorough introduction to the Roman 
annalistic tradition, see Oakley 1997: 18-110.  For an analysis of Dionysius and Greek historiography, see Gabba 
1991: 1-22. 
17.  Zetzel 1995: 116; Cornell 2001: 13.  
18.  Mommsen 1887: 2.143; Zetzel 1995: 150. 
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records, suggests that the annales were first introduced as early as the fifth century.19 
 The second source for early information on the dictatorship is the consular and triumphal 
fasti, the early portions of which may have even relied on the annales maximi for original annual 
lists of magistrates.20  The consular fasti preserve a record of the names of consuls, dictators and 
magistri equitum, military tribunes, and even censors back to the year 509.21  Not only were they 
an important dating tool, but they also provided another framework for Roman annalists.  The 
consular fasti have survived relatively intact and are particularly valuable for studying the 
dictatorship because each dictatorial entry contains a causa, the function of the appointment.22  
These dictatorial causae form an invaluable basis for much of my argument about early Roman 
use of the dictatorship.  I shall also use the triumphal fasti, which record the years in which both 
consuls and dictators celebrated triumphs.  In each example of a dictatorship presented in this 
thesis, an analysis of the corresponding entry in the consular or triumphal fasti is included.  The 
corroboration of these epigraphic sources provides an important link between events of the early 
Republic and historians writing in the late Republic. 
 Another body of evidence from the early Republic came in the form of family histories 
kept by elite Roman gentes.  Oakley points out that family eulogies and the information attached 
to imagines likely provided source material for later Roman annalists.23  Livy, lamenting that 
such sources could also contaminate evidence, notes the survival of early family histories even in 
his own day (8.40.4-5).  Just as in the annales maximi, information from these family histories 
can only be found in traces in later literary sources. 
                                                 
19.  For discussions of the annales maximi, see Frier 1979: 33, 176-178; Cornell 2001: 13-16; Oakley 1997: 
24-27; and Brennan 2000a: 6-7.  Ogilvie 1965: 6 n. 1 suggests that Livy, at least, did not have direct access to the 
contents of the annales, even in a later, published form. 
20.  Cornell 2001: 15.  
21.  For an introduction to the consular and triumphal fasti, see Cornell 2001: 218-223, 356. 
22.  See Hartfield 1982: 4-8 for an introduction to dictatorial causae. 
23.  Oakley 1997: 28-33; Cornell 2001: 9-10; Brennan 2000a: 7, 248 n. 10.  See Flower 1996: 180-184 for 
a discussion of the tituli attached to imagines and displayed in the atria of aristocratic Roman houses. 
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Finally, in the analysis of Italic dictatorships in Chapter Two, primary epigraphic material 
provides crucial evidence for which details in literary sources offer historical context.  In the 
exploration of Carthaginian dictatores, moreover, the usefulness of epigraphic information being 
employed alongside literary narrative is clear. 
 Livy and Dionysius are the principal literary sources used in this study of the Roman 
dictatorship.  Both historians made use of the annales maximi, consular fasti, and family histories, 
not to mention material produced by earlier Roman historians from the late-third and second 
centuries.  It is clear that, however incomplete the state of the evidence, Livy and Dionysius had 
a relatively large amount of earlier information from which to construct their narratives.  This is 
not to dismiss the fact that each writer misinterpreted some pieces of evidence and disregarded 
others at times.  Moreover, both Livy and Dionysius used speeches to characterize what they 
themselves thought was the best course of action in a given situation.24  Nevertheless, the core of 
earlier information was accessible to these authors.  In particular, epigraphic and annalistic 
material offered a valuable framework of Roman use of the dictatorship in the early Republic.  
The evidence for dictatorial usage registered in the consular and triumphal fasti alone compels us 
to reconsider Livy and Dionysius’ accounts of the original function of the dictatorship in the 
early period.  Consequently, we may be relatively certain at least about a given year’s magisterial 
array and dictatorial causae.25  The narratives of Livy and Dionysius, who had access to the fasti 
as well as other sources, make a reconsideration of the early dictatorship even more warranted.  
In addition to Livy and Dionysius, important information on the dictatorship is preserved in 
Polybius, Cicero, Appian, and Cassius Dio. 
                                                 
24.  Specifically, speeches were a means of the historian inserting their notions into historical narratives.  
See Oakley 1997: 120-122; Marincola 2007: 119-127. 
25.  Oakley 1997: 41-44 believes that lists of early dictators, including those recorded in the consular fasti, 
are generally reliable. 
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One aspect of my methodology requires further explanation.  I propose to use such 
authors as Livy and Dionysius as literary evidence for the early dictatorship.  I use their texts, 
however, in two different ways.  First, when these authors engage in a presentation of the 
institution of the dictatorship they bring to their analyses preconceived notions of dictatorial 
supremacy.  These notions pervade their views of the office (see above).  Second, and in contrast, 
a close reading of narratives describing individual dictatorships from the early Republic reveals 
that these authors diverge from their a priori understanding of the office and they betray details 
that become important pieces of evidence that can be used to contradict traditional views of the 
dictatorship.  By extracting these obscured details from late Republican literary sources and 
placing them next to evidence from epigraphic sources, we may begin to see the early 
dictatorship in its original form: a provisional magistracy, and one equivalent to the consulship. 
15 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE DICTATORSHIP OUTSIDE THE ROMAN POLITY 
 
 In this chapter, I shall introduce uses of the dictatorship outside the Roman political 
system, namely in Latin cities and in Roman characterizations of the Carthaginian military 
structure.  Through a juxtaposition of these systems with that of the Roman Republic, I intend to 
begin constructing a framework for my argument that the early Roman dictatorship was an ad 
hoc magistracy, reserved primarily for ancillary military tasks, and that the dictator himself 
functioned above all as a colleague of the consuls, wielding only standard consular imperium. 
 For Latin dictatorships, I shall collect disparate evidence in order to interpret forms of the 
office outside the city of Rome in various communities throughout Latium.  It will become clear 
from this reconstruction that Latin cities maintained the dictatorship for a variety of functions – 
annual executive magistrates, military commanders, chief priests, as well as for provisional tasks.  
What will also become clear is that these Latin dictators never appear to have functioned as 
supreme or emergency magistrates equipped with unrestricted authority.  Scholars have long 
noted possible connections between Latin dictatorships and the origins of the office at Rome.  I 
shall advance this argument further by demonstrating that the dictatorships thus employed 
throughout Latium represent historical precedents for an executive but not supreme office and a 
magistracy that was reserved for specific tasks.  What is more, I shall introduce dictatorial 
examples from the Roman system that evoke these Latin uses and thus align the Roman office 
more closely with the Latin model. 
 In the second part of this chapter, I shall interpret three elusive references in which Latin 
authors attach the title dictator to Carthaginian generals.  These Carthaginians were clearly field 
commanders, leading Carthaginian armies abroad without occupying an active magisterial role at 
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home.  The fact that Latin authors thought it suitable to use the term dictator to denote foreign 
commanders reveals that as late as the second century, the Romans understood the dictatorship 
as a military office and introduces the possibility that the term was common register for ‘military 
commander’ in the early and middle Republic.  Such an interpretation challenges later 
Republican portrayals of the Roman dictatorship as a supremely powerful office. 
 
Dictatorships in Latium 
 The office of dictator was neither unique to nor a creation of the Roman polity.  Ancient 
literary sources, supported by epigraphic evidence, attest that communities throughout Latium 
utilized some form of the dictatorship for more than seven centuries.  For the earliest of these 
dictatorships, we must rely on information preserved by later authors, from Cato in the early 
second century to Plutarch in the second century A.D.  All of these sources approach Latin 
dictatorships from a Roman or Roman-dominated Greek perspective, depicting early Latin 
history from the perspective of absolute Roman hegemony in Latium.  Furthermore, extant 
inscriptions that register these Latin dictators, all late Republican or Imperial, present a 
dichotomy in the office: while literary characterizations propound the dictatorship as an 
administrative magistracy, the later inscriptions portray it as only a chief priesthood.  (The 
inconsistencies between the two accounts will be sorted out below.)  Despite these limitations, 
the sources do offer a glimpse into the administrative systems of early Latin communities and 
allow us to draw basic conclusions about how these dictators performed their office in the early 
centuries of the Republic. 
 In this chapter, I shall reconstruct four dictatorships, those at the communities of Alba 
Longa, Tusculum, and Lanuvium, and the dictator of the Latin League.  These dictators served a 
full range of functions, from regular annual magistrates to military commanders to provisional 
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officers.  Concurrently, literary accounts suggest that these dictators exercised a circumscribed 
form of imperium and that they were not reserved for emergency situations.  The characterization 
that will emerge is relevant to the Roman form of the dictatorship in the early Republic. 
 One scholar has recently identified that the crux of modern debate on the early Roman 
dictatorship is whether it was derived from a Latin model or was an innovation of the early 
Republican constitution.26  A brief outline of traditional views on this matter will be instructive 
here.  Niebuhr, whose ideas were often highly speculative, first introduced the theory that the 
post of dictator Latinus (this office will be discussed in detail later in this chapter) was filled in 
six-month intervals by a magistrate from one of the member cities in the Latin League, including 
Rome.  He proposed that some of the Roman dictators preserved in the consular fasti were 
temporary leaders of the Latin alliance and that the specific Roman institution traditionally 
identified as the supreme and emergency dictatorship was the magister populi, allegedly an 
earlier title for Roman dictators.27  Bandel and De Sanctis generally followed Niebuhr’s ideas 
about Latin influence on the Roman office, and more recently Ogilvie asserted that the Romans 
likely instituted the dictatorship in the early fifth century based on a Latin model.28  Soltau, 
moreover, expounded Niebuhr’s theory on the role of Romans in the Latin League, compiling 
lists of early Roman dictators registered in the consular fasti in order to demonstrate that they 
coincided with Rome’s leadership of the Latin League.  Nevertheless, Soltau also noted 
inconsistencies between the Latin and Roman dictatorships.  Of particular relevance here, he 
suggested that no Roman dictator ever assumed the sort of religious tasks that their Latin 
                                                 
26.  Ridley 1979: 304.  I follow Ridley’s article for a general framework of traditional views on the origin 
of the Roman dictatorship.  
27.  Niebuhr 1844: 158-159.  Cicero records that magister populi was an alternate title for dictator in the 
early Republic (Rep. 1.63).  
28.  De Sanctis 1907: 421-426; Ogilvie 1965: 281-282.  Bandel 1987: 6 concedes only this: ‘…dass die 
Dictatur keine bewusste Schöpfung gewesen, sondern kurze Zeit nach dem Verfalle der Monarchie aus den 
Zeitumständen heraus hervorgegangen sei, und zwar unter starker Einwirkung des latinischen Vorbildes.’ 
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counterparts performed.29  This assumption is incorrect, as the Romans employed the 
dictatorship for religious functions twice in the fourth century.30  Such service by Roman 
dictators is, in fact, an important aspect of a Roman office that parallels the Latin model. 
 Mommsen represented the other end of the spectrum, maintaining that the dictatorship 
emerged independently in the Roman system at the beginning of the Republic.  He proposed that 
the office developed into a regular magistracy in Latin cities, but retained the character of the 
monarchies they replaced.  At Rome, on the other hand, he believed that the dictatorship was 
extraordinary, a temporary manifestation of single rule from the old kinship.31  This view has 
been difficult for many scholars to accept, since it would seem paradoxical for the Romans to 
revert to any element of kingship so soon after overturning the monarchy.32  Rosenberg, 
furthermore, noted the antiquity of the Roman dictatorship but dismissed a connection with the 
Latin institution because of the many differences between the two forms.33  Finally, Rudolph 
asserted that Latin cities did not employ dictatorships before Rome forced the office onto them 
after its conquest of Latium.  He supposed that later Roman chroniclers mistakenly ascribed 
these later dictatorships to the early period.34  Rudolph’s view has found little support from 
subsequent scholars.35 
                                                 
29.  On a religious competence for Roman dictators, Soltau 1914: 360 comments, ‘Auch hatte der römische 
Diktator nie priesterliche Funktionen wie der latinische Diktator.’  See also pp. 363-368. 
30.  In 363, L. Manlius Capitolinus Imperiosus was appointed dictator clavi figendi causa, to drive a nail 
into the temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline in order to ward off plague (Livy 7.3), while in 344, P. Valerius 
Poplicola supervised religious festivals as dictator (Livy 7.28).  See Broughton 1951a: 117, 132. 
31.  Mommsen 1887: 2.143 on the origin of the Roman dictatorship and 2.170-172 on Latin dictatorships, 
where he concludes: ‘Wahrscheinlich sind also die latinischen Gemeinden dictatorischer Verfassung nicht auf dem 
gleichen Wege wie Rom von sich aus zur Beseitigung des Königthums gelangt, sondern es ist hier das Königthum 
geblieben, aber später unter römischem Einfluss gezwungen worden den Namen zu wechseln und der Annuität und 
schliesslich selbst der Collegialität sich zu unterwerfen.’ 
32.  Ridley 1979: 307-308.  
33.  Rosenberg 1913: 71-79. 
34.  Ridley 1979: 305. 
35.  For a view against Rudolph, see Sherwin-White 1973: 62-73.  Furthermore, Rudolph’s theory would 
imply that later inscriptions, which emphasize a religious dictatorship, represent the office thrust upon Latin 
communities by Rome.  Why would the Romans have transferred their dictatorship – according to my argument, still 
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 Sorting out the origin of the Roman dictatorship is only tangential to the scope of this 
thesis.  My aim in discussing the form of the dictatorship in Latium is to demonstrate that all 
around Rome during the early Republic we can cite historical examples of a restricted 
dictatorship with either annual or provisional duties.  Even so, I accept a Latin derivation of the 
Roman dictatorship.  The similarities between the four Latin dictatorships outlined in this chapter 
and the modified view of the early Roman office advocated in this thesis indicate a common 
structure between the two systems.  In fact, I shall explicate instances in which Roman use of the 
dictatorship overlaps with Latin use.  At the very least, Rome maintained a close connection to 
its Latin neighbors throughout the early Republic, and we should not be surprised to note Latin 
dictatorial elements in the Roman polity. 
 Let us turn first to the dictatorship at Alba Longa, introduced in the seventh century, 
according to Livy’s chronology (1.23.1-10).  During the reign of Tullus Hostilius at Rome, a 
series of border raids precipitated war between Rome and nearby Alba.  Livy records that the 
Alban king led an army to Rome, but died in camp before any fighting commenced.  The Albans 
appointed Mettius Fufetius as dictator for the specific purpose of resuming the campaign against 
Rome.  Two comments on Livy’s account must be made here.  First, I do not interpret this 
dictatorship as an emergency magistracy.  Rather, Livy characterizes the situation as the ordinary 
replacement of a military commander, who was in this case the Alban king.  The Albans did not 
debate about how to replace the deceased king nor did they hesitate to select; the appointment 
was fluid and ordinary.  Second, the fact that Mettius replaced the king should not be taken as 
evidence that he assumed the royal office.  On the contrary, Livy’s narrative emphasizes the 
                                                                                                                                                             
a provisional military office when the Romans completed the conquest of Latium – to Latin cities in the form of a 
chief priesthood?  A more natural progression would suggest that an earlier administrative form of the dictatorship 
transitioned into a priesthood in these Latin cities after the Roman conquest.  For a more detailed discussion of this 
transformation, see below. 
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provisional military character of Mettius’ position.  The historian is ambiguous about who 
appointed Mettius, simply stating: dictatorem Albani Mettium Fufetium creant.  Even so, there is 
no report that a delegation from Alba was involved, and given the apparent speed with which the 
appointment was made, we must assume that the Alban army itself was responsible.  Mettius and 
the Roman king Hostilius conferred before leading their troops into battle, and the speech that 
Livy places in the mouth of Mettius is revelatory for the Alban’s perception of his function as 
dictator (1.23.7-8): 
‘iniurias et non redditas res ex foedere quae repetitae sint, et ego regem nostrum Cluilium causam huiusce 
esse belli audisse videor, nec te dubito, Tulle, eadem prae te ferre; sed si vera potius quam dictu speciosa 
dicenda sunt, cupido imperii duos cognatos vicinosque populos ad arma stimulat. neque, recte an 
perperam, interpretor, fuerit ista eius deliberatio qui bellum suscepit: me Albani gerendo bello ducem 
creavere…’ 
  
‘I seem to have heard that our king Cluilius [claimed] the injustices and seized property, sought after but 
not restored in accordance with the treaty, as the cause of this war, and I have no doubt that for your part, 
Tullus, you think the same thing. But if the truth rather than fallacious assertions must be discussed, the 
desire of power rouses two kindred and neighboring peoples to arms. I do not infer whether this is right or 
wrong. That was the concern for him who undertook this war: the Albans have made me commander for 
waging war…’ 
 
Mettius discerned his task as purely military.  His explanation that he was in no position to 
discuss the causes of the war underlines his military function.  The war was eventually decided 
by heroic combat between two sets of triplets, the Horatii and Curiatii, and Livy adds that when 
the Romans and Albans conducted sacrifices before the contest, Mettius was assisted by Alban 
sacerdotes.36  The fact that he required priests to perform this ritual indicates that his authority 
did not extend into the realm of religion; his jurisdiction was restricted to his command of the 
Alban army.  It is also interesting to note Livy’s language here.  The phrase me Albani gerendo 
bello ducem creavere in Mettius’ speech is identical to the narrative reference to his appointment 
at 1.23.4, dictatorem Albani Mettium Fufetium creant.  These two examples imply that this 
                                                 
36.  For the combat between the Horatii and Curiatii, see Livy 1.24-25.  The role of the Alban pater 
patratus as chief priest for the military commander Mettius may rival the relationship between king Hostilius and 
the Roman fetialis, Livy 1.24.3-9. 
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language was the standard notation for dictatorial appointment in Livy’s sources, a fact that lends 
credibility to the information preserved in Livy. 
 Dionysius, who recounts a similar version of the dictatorship of Mettius Fufetius, 
confirms that the Alban army made the appointment (Ant. Rom. 3.5.3-4): εἰς δὲ τὸν ἐκείνου 
[Cluilius] τόπον ἀποδείκνυται στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου Μέττιος 
Φουφέττιος.  Dionysius does not assign the title dictator to Mettius, but refers to him as 
στρατηγός and αὐτοκράτωρ.  As we have already seen, Dionysius associates both terms with the 
Roman dictatorship.  Underlying his word choice of στρατηγός is his perception of the early 
Alban dictatorship as a military office, while αὐτοκράτωρ in this context denotes supreme 
military but otherwise circumscribed authority. 
 The story of Mettius Fufetius’ dictatorship may be pure invention, but what this episode 
reveals about Livy’s and Dionysius’ historiography is significant.  Both authors, writing in the 
period long after Rome completed its subjugation and amalgamation of the Latin communities, 
recognized the Alban dictatorship as an ancient and well-established office, and they found it 
unproblematic to interpose such a familiar institution on a legendary period of the Roman past.  
It is plausible that both Livy and Dionysius extracted a reference to Mettius Fufetius from earlier 
Roman tradition and that they found the Alban dictatorship registered in early annals.  The Alban 
dictatorship is, in fact, well attested in a later period.  An imperial inscription from Rome records 
that L. Fonteius Flavianus held the dictatorship at Alba, which appears to have been foremost 
among a series of religious offices.37  It seems, therefore, that by the imperial period the Alban 
dictator functioned as a chief priest.  This is consistent with a development traced in other Latin 
communities.  After Rome’s assimilation of these towns into its own political system in the 
                                                 
37.  ILS (Orelli and Henzen) 2293.  
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fourth century, the dictatorship remained a traditional Latin office but its jurisdiction was 
restricted to religious duties.  This development at Alba and other Latin cities will be discussed 
in detail below.  We may also detect a slight discrepancy in Livy’s account of Mettius Fufetius.  
Based solely on later inscriptions, Romans of the late Republic would understand the Alban 
dictatorship as a priesthood.  Why, then, was Livy not compelled to explain to his audience the 
use of this office as a provisional military command?  In fact, nowhere in his references to Latin 
dictators does Livy offer qualification of his use of the title dictator outside the Roman polity.  
Perhaps this can be attributed to the fact that Roman tradition preserved a memory of the Alban 
office from a period when it wielded genuine military or even administrative clout.  Other 
ancient literary sources confirm this hypothesis. 
 Dionysius, obliged to explain this non-Roman use of the dictatorship to his Greek 
audience, offers a key piece of evidence here.  In a discussion of the origins of the Roman 
dictatorship, in which he claims a Greek antecedent for the Roman office, he cites Licinius 
Macer’s alternative suggestion that the Alban institution inspired the Roman.38  Macer concluded 
that the Albans abolished their monarchy and installed the dictatorship as their annual executive 
magistracy.  Dionysius records this theory as follows (Ant. Rom. 5.74.4): 
Λικίννιος δὲ παρ’ Ἀλβανῶν οἴεται τὸν δικτάτορα Ῥωμαίους εἰληφέναι, τούτους λέγων πρώτους μετὰ 
τὸν Ἀμολίου καὶ Νεμέτορος θάνατον ἐκλιπούσης τῆς βασιλικῆς συγγενείας ἐνιαυσίους ἄρχοντας  
ἀποδεῖξαι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντας ἐξουσίαν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι, καλεῖν δ’ αὐτοὺς δικτάτορας. 
 
 Licinius thinks that the Romans took the dictatorship from the Albans, claiming that, after the death of  
Amulius and Numitor and after the ancestral kingship was abandoned, they were the first to appoint  
annual magistrates with the same authority as that of the kings and to name them dictators. 
 
Plutarch concurs with Macer’s theory, though he adds an element to the story.  He records that 
when the Alban king Numitor died, his grandson Romulus instituted an annual magistracy that 
                                                 
38.  Liebenam 1905: 389.26-38 maintained: ‘Dass Tullus die Amtszeit des D. ins dritte Jahr verlängerte, 
wird von Dionys. III.22.23.28 hervorgehoben.  Wenn der D. in Alba nur noch als Priester amtiert, so ist deshalb 
nicht auch den andern municipalen Dictatoren religiöser Charakter beizulegen.’ 
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sounds quite democratic: [Romulus] ἔθηκε τὴν πολιτείαν δημαγωγῶν (Romulus, currying favor 
with the people, set up a ‘republican government,’ Rom. 27.1).39  If Macer was correct that a 
dictator administered Alba, Plutarch makes the position sound more like an elected magistracy 
than an autocratic office. 
 While Livy and Dionysius emphasize the provisional military character of the Alban 
office, Macer and Plutarch portray it as a regular administrative post.  In either case, a limited 
jurisdiction is implied, whether restricted to an annual term or the command of an army.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Alban dictators exercised absolute authority.  Evidence 
from other Latin cities where dictatorships were in place indicates that dictators had to share 
power with two aediles.40  Finally, Ogilvie proposed that the name Mettius was simply a Latin 
adaptation of the Oscan title meddix.41  In the early Roman Republic, Oscan cities appointed 
meddices to lead their combined military coalitions in major wars.  If Ogilvie is correct that this 
Oscan institution found its way into Roman tradition in the form of Mettius Fufetius, its 
provisional character evokes that of the Latin dictatorship. 
 Within this basic framework of the Roman annalistic tradition, in which a memory of an 
administrative Alban dictatorship was preserved, Livy and Dionysius were free to construct their 
narratives on Rome’s early war with Alba.42  It is also interesting to note that in his account of 
Mettius’ speech at 1.23.7-8, Livy includes the phrase me Albani gerendo bello ducem creavere.  
                                                 
39.  LSJ: 1434 gives the definition ‘republican government’ in section III.2. 
40.  Sherwin-White 1973: 63-67 and Alföldi 1963: 377-398 offer excellent analyses of pre-Roman 
magisterial systems in Latium.  See also Ogilvie 1965: 427, who suggests that at Tusculum the dictatorship was 
replaced by a college of three aediles at some point after Rome’s conquest of the city.  For a discussion on the 
administration of the Latin League, see Alföldi 1963: 42-46. 
41.  Ogilvie 1965: 107 asserts that Mettius is a Latinized version of the Oscan office of meddix, utilized 
later as generalissimo of the Oscan military coalition.  For the office of meddix, see Rosenberg 1913: 15-22.; and 
Salmon 1967: 77-101. 
42.  For Livy, the Mettius-Hostilius cycle serves as a warning against perfidia on the part of Mettius, who 
treacherously incited the king of Veii against Rome, while the warmongering of the Roman king Hostilius, the foil 
to his predecessor Numa, lurks behind the story.  The episode also offers an interpretation of how Rome absorbed 
the Alban polity. 
24 
 
This evokes the language of the consular fasti, which classify many Roman dictators as rei 
gerundae causa (for the purpose of conducting military affairs).  For the military emphasis of res, 
I follow Hartfield, who has demonstrated that this phrase denoted a dictator for military purposes 
and became a conventional notation.43  Livy also frequently uses the verb creare to describe the 
appointment of Roman dictators.44  It is worth considering that the earlier sources from which he 
extracted information on Roman dictators contained similar references to the creation of Alban 
dictators, perhaps underlining that Livy did access earlier records for the Alban office.  While he 
does not evaluate the question of Alban influence on the Roman dictatorship, Livy’s language 
may provide a bridge between his narrative and early Roman tradition.  This interpretation of 
how Livy may have received and recounted the dictatorship of Mettius Fufetius satisfies the 
criteria of the two major schools of Livian scholarship.  The Quellenforschung school of thought, 
which views Livy as simply a mindless conduit to the work of earlier historical writers, attempts 
to trace how Livy moved from source to source as best fit his interests.  Within this framework, 
Livy simply reported information on Mettius that he found in earlier tradition.  Supporters of the 
Einzelerzählungen approach, who prefer to read Livy for his literary skill, can find in this 
episode an instance where the historian has developed an elegant narrative from basic facts 
retained in Roman annals.45 
 The Roman system yields at least one parallel to the Alban dictatorship as an emergency 
                                                 
43.  The phrase dictator rei gerundae causa accompanies the names of most early Roman dictators in the 
consular fasti.  See Hartfield 1982: 4-8. 
44.  For example, Livy records: apud veterrimos tamen auctores T. Larcium dictatorem primum, Sp. 
Cassium magistrum equitum creatos invenio (Even so, in the most ancient sources I find that T. Larcius was 
appointed as the first dictator with Spurius Cassius as magister equitum, 2.18.5). 
45.  The Quellenforschung school was established by the work of Nissen, while Witte and Burck were 
among the earliest scholars to articulate the ideas of the Einzelerzählungen school.  For characterizations of Livy 
within these two interpretations, see Ogilvie 1965: 5-7; and Walsh 1996: 141-151.  See Miles 1995: 1-7 on the 
‘rhetorical-thematic school’; and Pittenger 2008: 6-17 on reading Livy within the approach of ‘new historicism.’  
For a general overview of Livy’s historical methods, see Laistner 1963: 83-102; Oakley 1997: 111-151; and Chaplin 
and Kraus 2009: 1-14. 
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replacement for a commanding magistrate killed in the field.  Livy records that in 362 one consul 
was killed in battle against the Hernici (7.6.7-7.8.7).  Rather than resort to extemporaneous 
election or the use of a consul suffectus, the surviving consul appointed App. Claudius Crassus 
Inregillensis as dictator to resume the campaign.  The consular fasti confirm this dictator’s 
military function, designating his appointment as rei gerundae causa. 
 For a reconstruction of the second Latin dictatorship, we turn to Cato.  At Orig. 2.21 (= fr. 
58 P) he documents the dedication of a sacred grove at Aricia by the dictator of the Latin League, 
the dictator Latinus: 
lucum Dianium in nemore Aricino Egerius Baebius Tusculanus dedicavit dictator Latinus, hi populi 
communiter Tusculanus, Aricinus, Lanuvinus, Laurens, Coranus, Tiburtis, Pometinus, Ardeatis Rutulus.46 
 
The Latin dictator Egerius Baebius, a Tusculan, dedicated the grove of Diana in the Arician woods; 
represented commonly were the Tusculans, Aricians, Lanuvians, Laurentians, Corans, Tiburtines,  
Pometians, and Ardean Rutulians. 
 
This fragment is the earliest extant reference to the position of dictator Latinus and is a key but 
problematic piece of evidence for understanding the structure of the archaic Latin League.  
Cornell suggests that Cato likely copied this dedication from an actual inscription at the lucus 
Dianius.47  The fragmentary remains of Cato’s Orig. make it difficult to contextualize this 
passage, though scholars generally assign the event to around 500.48  Baebius’ role as dictator 
Latinus has, in part, given rise to the theory that the various Latin communities maintained a 
common dictatorship.  Although Cato portrays the dictator Latinus as a chief religious magistrate, 
                                                 
46.  Peter read Laevius, though most scholars prefer the MS that records Baebius.  See Green 2007: 88. 
47.  Cornell 1989: 272-273. 
48.  Sherwin-White 1973: 12-13 suggests that record of this dedication occurred early in Orig., and given 
that Cato began his work from the foundation of Rome, an early date for this fragment thus makes sense.  Cornell 
1989: 273 places the event around 500, at a time when the Latin cities still maintained a strong coalition against 
Rome.  At 1995: 297-298, however, he notes that the list of communities is too short to include the entire Latin 
League.  Alföldi 1963: 42, 47-56 finds an Etruscan parallel for the dictator Latinus that suggests the dictator’s dual 
role as military and religious leader; he also offers bibliography on the subject.  Green 2007: 88-90, on the other 
hand, finds no reason to think that the dedication of the grove referred to any action by the Latin League.  In fact, 
she proposes that the event recorded by Cato predated the formation of the coalition.  She characterizes the grove at 
Aricia as one of many such places consecrated throughout Latium.  These sanctuaries served as neutral meeting 
places for feuding communities, whose warriors disarmed before entering.  Negotiations thus became more 
amenable.  
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Roman tradition holds that the dictator Latinus was primarily a coalition military commander.  
Niebuhr, followed by Ogilvie, thought that the Romans participated in the Latin League in the 
earliest years of the Republic and that the dictator Latinus inspired the Roman dictatorship.49  
Likewise, Alföldi proposed that other Latin communities adapted the post as their annual 
magistrates.50  As discussed above, Rome’s dictatorship may have retained elements of the 
command structure of the Latin League.  A passage in Livy supports Niebuhr’s theory of a 
rotating Latin dictatorship that included Roman participation (3.18.2).  In 460 the dictator levied 
an army in order to march to the aid of Rome, where an impending attack threatened the city.  
The implication is that the dictator acted on behalf of the entire Latin League.  A close reading of 
Livy’s Latin is helpful here.  He records: L. Mamilius Tusculi tum dictator erat (L. Mamilius, the 
dictator, was in Tusculum at that time, 3.18.2).  Tusculi is likely in the locative case.  If so, it is 
plausible that Mamilius was in his home city of Tusculum but acting in his capacity as dictator 
Latinus.51  A second example is even more noteworthy.  In 431 A. Postumius Tubertus, recorded 
by Livy and others as Roman dictator but not registered in any consular fasti, raised an army that 
included a contingent of Latins and Hernicians.  He, too, may have served as dictator Latinus 
over troops of the Latin League.52 
 Another theory that has gained approval among scholars is that at the pivotal battle of 
Lake Regillus in 499 the Tusculan Octavus Mamilius commanded Latin forces as dictator 
Latinus.53  Valerius Maximus, writing during the reign of Tiberius, explicitly calls Mamilius 
dictator (1.8.1).  Dionysius recalls a Latin coalition arrayed against Rome during this period and 
                                                 
49.  Niebuhr 1844: 158-159; Ogilvie 1965: 281-282. 
50.  Alföldi 1963: 42-43. 
51.  Ogilvie 1965: 427 offers no comment on the meaning of Tusculi. 
52.  Drummond 1989: 192.  The campaign is recounted in Livy 4.26-29.  For Postumius’ absence from the 
consular fasti for this year, see Broughton 1951a: 63-64. 
53.  Cornell 1995: 216, 298.  For the ramifications of this battle on the Roman system, see Ridley 1979: 
308-309. 
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refers to the leaders of the Latin forces, in this case co-commanders, as στρατηγοὺς 
αὐτοκράτορας (Ant. Rom. 5.61.1-5).  As we have seen, this is his regular terminology for 
denoting a dictatorship.  It remains uncertain whether the dictator Latinus mentioned by Cato 
was appointed provisionally for the dedication of the grove of Diana or corresponded to 
reconstructions of the military leadership of the Latin League.  Perhaps the dictator had a dual 
function, as religious as well as military head of the coalition.  In either case, no evidence 
suggests that he wielded authority within any constituent city.54  If this Latin dictatorship can be 
taken as a model of a purely military command, most early Roman dictators fit the paradigm.  If 
it was a religious post, perhaps even provisional for the dedication of the sacred grove, the early 
Roman polity offers one analogous dictatorship.  In 363, L. Manlius Capitolinus Imperiosus was 
named dictator clavi figendi causa (for the purpose of driving the nail).  The symbolic act of 
driving a nail into the temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline Hill was intended, according to the 
memories of the elderly Romans who advised the ritual, to appease the gods and ward off the 
plague that was afflicting Rome.  The Romans employed few dictatorships for non-military 
purposes before 300.  Despite an overwhelmingly military character, the few Roman 
dictatorships for provisional functions – Imperiosus’ term is a prime example – bring the Roman 
office into close alignment with the Latin model.  Moreover, Imperiosus’ dictatorship reveals the 
restricted nature of Roman dictatorial imperium.  After driving the nail into the temple, the 
dictator attempted to exceed his jurisdiction by levying an army and trying to incite war.  Under 
intense pressure from his colleagues, Imperiosus eventually handed over his dictatorship.  
Clearly, not all Roman dictators wielded unrestricted imperium, and the office was utilized for 
                                                 
54.  This point is not necessarily inconsistent with Soltau’s view that the dictator Latinus wielded 
extraordinary imperium in command of Latin coalition forces; see Ridley 1979: 307.  As will be demonstrated in 
Chapter Three, a Roman consul’s imperium within a military context was absolute and, therefore, sufficient for a 
dictator whose jurisdiction was almost exclusively military in the early Republic.  
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provisional tasks.55 
 Livy is the source for our third Latin dictatorship, this one established within the local 
structure of Tusculum (6.25.1-6.26.8).  In 379, the Tusculans were allegedly an active member of 
a military coalition against Rome.  L. Furius Camillus, serving as military tribune for the sixth 
time, besieged Tusculum but halted his attack when he saw no traces of military activity within 
the city.  Camillus arranged for the Roman senate to receive a Tusculan delegation, at the head of 
which was a dictator.  Livy is not explicit whether this dictator was appointed ad hoc to lead this 
contingent or was the annual magistrate at Tusculum.  If provisional, his office recalls the role of 
the dictator Latinus at the sacred grove at Aricia, while a Tusculan dictator as regular executive 
magistrate is analogous to the magisterial systems of other Latin cities.56  In either case, 
circumscribed jurisdiction for a single task or the restriction of term limit make it unlikely that 
this Tusculan dictator wielded an extraordinary form of power.57  Within the Roman system we 
find a similar use of the dictatorship.  In 314, at the height of the Second Samnite War, the senate 
appointed C. Maenius as dictator to conduct investigations (exercendis quaestionibus) of anti-
Roman conspiracies at Capua.58  Livy, through a speech by Maenius to his political detractors, 
characterizes the appointment in this way (9.26.14): 
‘neque enim, quod saepe alias, quia ita tempora postulabant rei publicae, qui bello clarissimus esset, sed 
qui maxime procul ab his coitionibus vitam egisset, dictator deligendus exercendis quaestionibus fuit.’ 
 
‘The man chosen as dictator for supervising these investigations had to be one who remained particularly  
unfamiliar with these conspiracies, not one who was most renowned in war, as often other times demanded 
                                                 
55.  Livy 7.3.1-9.  This episode is important for discussions on the form of collegiate magistracy in the 
early Roman Republic.  The prophesy recorded by Livy claimed that the praetor maximus must drive the nail.  He 
goes on to recount that this task was performed by consuls and later transferred to dictators. 
56.  Oakley 1997: 603-604 finds no reason to reject Livy’s reference to the dictatorship at Tusculum in this 
period.  
57.  The Tusculan delegation to Rome is recorded by Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 14.6 fr.), Plutarch (Cam. 38), 
and Dio (7.28 fr.).  None of these authors offers comment on the leadership of the mission. 
58.  Livy 9.26.5-22; Diodorus maintains that Maenius marched into Campania at the head of an army, 
19.76.1-5.  The consular fasti designate Maenius as dictator rei gerundae causa for the year 314.  For the 
development of an expanded jurisdiction for dictators rei gerundae causa in the fourth century, see Hartfield 1982: 
99-132; and 108-114 for an analysis of Maenius’ dictatorship in particular.  
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of the Republic.’ 
 
This is a clear example of a Roman dictator performing a provisional assignment, one of the few 
non-military dictatorships introduced in the early Republic. 
 The fourth Latin dictatorship to be discussed is that at Lanuvium, the dictator Lanuvinus.  
Cicero mentions this office three times in his defense of T. Annius Milo (27.5; 45.3; 46.5).59  In 
52 Milo, a native of Lanuvium, held a praetorship in Rome along with the post of dictator 
Lanuvinus.  Cicero’s portrayal of the office demonstrates its religious character.  When Milo 
became involved in the infamous altercation with P. Clodius Pulcher on the Via Appia, he was 
en route to appoint a flamen for the cult of Juno Sospes at Lanuvium, the major cult center for 
the goddess in Latium.60  The fact that this event occurred in January has prompted scholars to 
suppose that the selection of apparitors for this cult was an annual event, carried out at the 
beginning of the year.61  In turn, it is likely that the Lanuvian dictatorship also rotated annually.  
The circumstances of this succession may be a remnant of an earlier period when the dictator 
Lanuvinus served as an administrative magistrate, perhaps elected at the beginning of the year.  
Even so, four inscriptions, at least two of which are imperial, establish the religious competence 
of this dictatorship.62  Other inscriptions reveal that religious dictatorships were pervasive in 
                                                 
59.  Clark 1895: 23 rejects the MSS reading quod erat dictator Lanuvi Milo at Mil. 27.5, suggesting that it 
was a scholium that became interpolated in the text.  He notes that the indicative erat does not fit the oratio obliqua 
of this sentence.  Other scholars have suggested that Cicero himself added the line when the speech was written 
down, as an apostrophe to readers.  Clark doubts this notion, proposing that even in editing, Cicero wanted to 
preserve the ‘illusion’ of a spoken oration.  See also Colson 1898: 64, who notes the evolution of the Lanuvian 
dictatorship from administrative to religious office.  Furthermore, Long 1858: 336 thought that Cicero’s use of the 
verb prodere (…Miloni esse Lanuvium ad flaminem prodendum, Mil. 27.4-5) evoked the language used by Latin 
authors to describe the appointment of an interrex at Rome.  Asconius (Mil. 27) confirms that Milo was a native of 
Lanuvium.  See Lewis 2006:235.  
60.  Marshall 1985: 163-164 explains that Lanuvium was the primary cult center of Juno Sospes.  Livy 
records that in the settlement after Rome’s victory in the Latin War in 338 the temple and grove of Juno at 
Lanuvium was designated as open to both the Romans and Lanuvians, 8.14.3.  
61.  For a general discussion of the date, see Long 1858: 336. 
62.  The dictator Lanuvinus is confirmed by ILS (Orelli and Henzen) 3786, 5157, and 6068, and CIL 
14.2110.  ILS (Orelli and Henzen) 3786 dates to the reign of Claudius and records that C. Caecius Pulcher held the 
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other Latin cities in the late Republic.63 
 The clearly religious character of Milo’s dictatorship and the profusion of similar 
dictatorships attested in epigraphic material are indicative of a dichotomy in use of the Latin 
office.  Literary accounts of the Alban, Tusculan, and Latin League dictatorships portray an 
office with genuine administrative or command authority, but all refer to events no later than the 
middle of the fourth century.  Then, later inscriptions present an office apparently stripped of 
magisterial authority but listed as primary among a series of religious offices.  In between there 
emerges a disparity.  Sherwin-White offers clarification.  He proposed that the Latin cities where 
the dictatorship had been established experienced a common trend in their use of the office.  In 
338 Rome, by this period a dominant central Italian power and adversary of its Latin neighbors, 
defeated the combined forces of the Latins and finally dissolved the Latin League.  Over the next 
two centuries Rome completed the process of absorbing these communities into its own 
administrative sphere.  Concurrently, the Romans removed the political authority from Latin 
executive magistracies that had become redundant under Roman jurisdiction.  Sherwin-White 
observes that many Latin cities retained their dictatorships, formerly their highest magistracy, as 
the religious functionaries registered in later inscriptions.  This transition provides a link between 
the two phases of Latin dictatorships.  The archaic lex Acilia may hold some relevance here.  
                                                                                                                                                             
dictatorship along with an aedileship.  CIL 14.2110, inscribed on a marble tablet, is likely also imperial.  
Furthermore, see Rosenberg 1913: 73, 75. 
63.  Three inscriptions from Nomentum contain references to Roman magistrates holding the dictatorship 
along with other religious posts in that town, a situation analogous to Milo’s positions at Lanuvium: CIL 14.3941; 
CIL 14.3955; and ILS (Orelli and Henzen) 7032.  ILS (Orelli and Henzen) 7032 records that P. Pacilius Laetus held 
the dictatorship at Nomentum for performing sacrifices (sacris faciundis).  What is more, the fact that the dictator 
was just one of a series of religious officers at Nomentum further emphasizes that it was not supreme, even within a 
religious capacity.  The dictatorship at Aricia is verified by three inscriptions (CIL 14.2169; CIL 14.2213; and CIL 
14.4195), one of which (CIL 14.2213) dates to the reign of Trajan.  Though these inscriptions are difficult to 
contextualize, they indicate that Latin dictatorships, surviving as religious offices, were maintained into the imperial 
period.  Concomitantly, the third-century A.D. Latin biographer Aelius Spartianus claims that the emperor Hadrian 
once held a Latin dictatorship, though he does not specify in which town, Hadr. 19. 
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Dated to around 122, it catalogs the dictatorship as foremost among Italian magistracies.64  The 
late date of the lex, recorded over two centuries after the breakup of the Latin League, is puzzling.  
It could push forward significantly the date for the transition from administrative to religious 
function for Latin magistracies, or it could be anachronistic in the second century.  At any rate, 
taken with literary characterizations of Latin dictatorships in the early Republic, the lex must at 
least preserve the rank of magistracies from an earlier period when these offices exercised 
substantive administrative authority. 
 It may be tempting to infer that the early and later forms of Latin dictatorships 
represented two different offices, connected only by the title dictator.  The fluidity of this title, 
however, is important.  It demonstrates the adaptability of the office – it could be modified to fit 
any circumstance, from administrator to military commander to chief priest. 
 The office of dictator was an integral component of the administrative systems of many 
cities throughout Latium.  Full reconstruction of these dictatorships is not feasible, though we 
can cull together a general characterization of the institution.  First, Latin communities conferred 
on their dictators a level of authority roughly equivalent to the imperium possessed by a Roman 
consul, but no source implies that they received absolute magisterial power.  Some dictators were 
granted an even more restricted form of authority, adequate for their ad hoc functions.  Of the 
four dictatorships discussed in this section, the post of dictator Latinus remains difficult to 
classify.65  Nevertheless, the notion of a coalition military or religious leader is still relevant to 
the Roman office, particularly because Rome was likely a participant in the Latin League in the 
early Republic.  The Roman dictatorship may still reflect the character of the dictator Latinus.  
                                                 
64.  Sherwin-White 1973: 58-71.  The lex Acilia records: quei eorum in sua quisque civitate dictator 
praetor aedilisve non fuerint. 
65.  For the position of dictator Latinus, incidentally, we may compare similar coalition military 
commanders from central Italy, namely the Etruscan zilath and Oscan meddix.  See Rosenberg 1913: 1-22; Salmon 
1967: 77-101; and Banti 1973: 199-207. 
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Rome’s close association with its Latin neighbors makes it plausible that the two political 
structures shared many common elements.  The Roman parallels to Latin dictatorial functions 
outlined above elicit traces of this relationship.  I interpret these vestiges as confirmation that, in 
its earliest iteration, the Roman dictatorship was more closely aligned with the Latin paradigm 
than with the traditional supreme dictatorship emphasized by writers of the later Republic. 
 
Carthaginian Dictatores 
There are three references to Carthaginian dictatores in extant Latin, two from the middle 
Republic and one from the first century A.D.  Little context can be established for two of these, 
while the third is likely a late Republican copy of an early inscription.  Although we should be 
cautious in drawing definite conclusions from such a paucity of evidence, it is clear in each 
reference that the Latin author used the term dictator to characterize the position of Carthaginian 
military commanders who may have been equivalent to Roman consuls.  This characterization, 
taken with the fact that nearly all the Roman dictatorships in the period 501-300 were military, is 
important for understanding the nature of the early Roman institution.66 
 Cato records the earliest reference to a Carthaginian dictator.  At Orig. 4 fr. 12 (= Peter 
84.1-87.1) he writes67: 
deinde duovicesimo anno post dimissum bellum, quod quattor et viginti annos fuit, Carthaginienses sextum 
de foedere decessere. igitur dictatorem Carthaginiensium magister equitum monuit, ‘mitte mecum Romam 
equitatum; diequinti in Capitolio tibi cena cocta erit’ – deinde dictator iubet postridie magistrum equitum 
arcessi; ‘mittam te, si vis, cum equitibus.’ ‘sero est,’ inquit magister equitum, ‘iam rescivere.’ 
 
Then, in the twenty-second year of a war that lasted twenty-four years, the Carthaginians left the treaty for 
the sixth time. Accordingly, the master of the horse advised the Carthaginian dictator, ‘Send the cavalry 
with me to Rome, and on the fifth day a dinner will be prepared for you on the Capitoline.’ On the 
following day the dictator ordered that the master of the horse be summoned. ‘I shall send you with the 
cavalry, if you wish,’ [he said]. ‘It is too late now,’ replied the master of the horse, ‘they have already 
discovered [the plan].’ 
 
                                                 
66.  For the early Roman dictatorship as almost exclusively a military command, see below, Chapter Three. 
67.  Aulus Gellius quotes this passage from Cato within the context of explaining the grammatical use of 
sextum or sexto, one to denote order and the other to express frequency (NA 10.24.7).  
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Peter presumed that this passage recounted an incident of the First Punic War.  Next to this 
section he arranged fragment 89.1, which mentions events around the Sicilian harbor of 
Drepanum, where in 249 the Romans suffered a severe naval defeat at the hands of the 
Carthaginian admiral Adherbal.68  Apart from this speculation, the context for this Catonian 
passage is indefinite.  What is more important, however, is his use of the term dictator to denote 
a Carthaginian commander.  It appears that this dictator was a field commander in Sicily – the 
location of all fighting in the First Punic War – with no active role in the government of Carthage 
at the time.  Furthermore, numerous Carthaginian commanders operated simultaneously in Sicily 
during the lengthy First Punic War, obscuring a clear distinction between their relative ranks.69  
Why, then, was it acceptable to a Roman audience for Cato to refer to a regular foreign 
commander as dictator? 
 The best evidence for what the Carthaginians called their own magistrate-commanders is 
derived from scattered references in Latin authors.  The Punic title sufes is generally identified as 
the Carthaginian equivalent to the Roman consul.70  Livy mentions these magistrates three times.  
At 28.37.2 he claims that they are the highest Carthaginian magistrates (qui summus Poenis est 
magistratus), while at 34.61.15 the sufetes appear more like an executive council.  At 30.7.5, 
however, Livy offers the best explanation for their authority: senatum itaque sufetes, quod velut 
consulare imperium apud eos erat, vocaverunt (The sufetes, because their authority is like a 
consul’s, convened the senate).  This latter reference to convening and mediating the 
Carthaginian senate implies parity between the Carthaginian sufes and Roman consul, and Livy’s 
portrayal of the factionalism in the Carthaginian senate elsewhere in the passage demonstrates 
                                                 
68.  Polybius 1.49-51 narrates the battle of Drepanum, in which Roman plans to surprise the Carthaginian 
fleet collapsed.  Superior Carthaginian crews outmaneuvered the Romans and captured some ninety-three Roman 
ships.  See Walbank 1957: 112-115; and Goldsworthy 2000: 119-121. 
69.  Lazenby 1996: 20-21; Goldsworthy 2000: 76-95. 
70.  OLD: 1860. 
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that the sufetes did not wield absolute authority.  Additionally, Livy emphasizes the military role 
of the sufetes within this same passage. 
 It appears that Cato was attempting to explain to his Roman audience the Carthaginian 
magisterial and command system using a Roman model.  His sources for the First Punic War 
were likely the same sources employed by Polybius.  The Sicilian historian Philinus wrote a pro-
Carthaginian monograph on the war and the Roman annalist Fabius Pictor covered this conflict 
in his history of Rome.71  Apart from Cato’s personal familiarity with Carthage, these sources 
likely offered him a detailed account of the Carthaginian system.  Consequently, if Livy knew of 
the Carthaginian office of sufes, Cato surely did as well.72  The fact that Cato invokes the title 
dictator in fragment 84.1-87.1 instead of sufes may imply that he was using the term generically 
to denote a military commander that occupied a role separate from the regular sufetes.  It is worth 
considering his near contemporary Polybius here.  In his account of the First Punic War, 
nowhere does he identify a Carthaginian dictator.73  This suggests that Cato interjected the term 
into a Carthaginian context, and this was an appropriate addition if Cato understood the 
dictatorship as simply a military command.74 
 Cato’s use of the title dictator to denote a Carthaginian commander is paralleled by an 
inscription, CIL 1.25.  The following lines were inscribed on a column base commemorating the 
naval victory of C. Duilius in 260, the fourth year of the First Punic War: 
[Duilius]…claseis Poenicas omnis item maxumas copias Cartaginiensis  
praesented Hanibaled dictatored olorom in altod marid pugnad vicet…75 
                                                 
71.  Polybius mentions his sources for the First Punic War at 1.14.  See also Walbank 1957: 26-35. 
72.  Let alone principal magistracies, Cato displays familiarity with other Punic terms.  For example, Cato 
uses the Punic word mapalia, which denotes Carthaginian villages (Orig. P 78.1); OLD: 1078. 
73.  This is not too surprising, given Polybius’ narrow view of the dictatorship; he never applies the title 
dictator outside the Roman system. 
74.  It is also interesting to note that Cato extends his analogy with the Roman system by applying the Latin 
title magister equitum to a Carthaginian cavalry commander.  In this case, it may be best to understand the 
Carthaginian magister equitum as a subordinate cavalry commander, as in the Roman system.   
75.  Gordon 1983: 124-127.  The Carthaginian admiral has been identified as Hannibal Gisco. 
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[Duilius]…in a battle on the deep sea, defeated the whole Punic fleet along  
with many Carthaginian troops commanded by their dictator Hannibal… 
 
The column was erected in the most public of venues, beside the rostrum in the Roman Forum.  
The base is marble, not tufa, which suggests that it is a late Republican or early Imperial copy.  
Scholars are split on the issue of whether the extant inscription is a precise copy of what 
appeared on the original base or whether alterations were made.  On the one hand, scholars cite 
the difficulty in transferring inscribed letters from tufa, which is susceptible to wearing away, 
and the fact that late Republican engravers may not have understood conventions of archaic 
Latin.  Other epigraphers find parallels in Augustan monuments in which elogia were purposely 
archaized to resemble Republican antecedents.  According to this argument, the extant Duilius 
inscription may be quite different from the original.  On the other hand, the numerous archaisms, 
most notably the -d ending in the ablative singular, may, in fact, demonstrate its antiquity.  The 
grammarian Quintilian knew of the inscription and thought it was archaic, and epigraphers note 
similarities between this inscription and genuine archaic inscriptions found on tufa monuments.76  
Whether the transcription is faithful to the original or the inscriber archaized the copy, it may be 
assumed that at least this third-century usage of the title dictator is preserved.  The writer either 
copied dictator from the original text or was aware of earlier, non-Roman uses of the term.  
Furthermore, we have already seen that perceptions of the dictatorship in the late Republic and 
early Empire were negative, a fact that would almost certainly preclude later interpolation in a 
copy of the Duilius inscription.77 
                                                 
76.  Gordon 1983: 124-127.  Pliny the Elder (NH 34.20) was also aware of the column, as was Servius, who 
writes (ad Georg. 3.29.5): nam rostratas Duilius posuit, victis Poenis navali certamine, e quibus unam in rostris, 
alteram ante circum videmus a parte ianuarum.   
77.  I discuss late Republican perceptions of the Roman dictatorship in Chapter One, while in Chapter Five 
I examine the role of Sulla’s office on Roman views of the office.  For a representative later aversion to the 
dictatorship, see Dionysius Ant. Rom. 5.77.4, where he claims that the cruelties of Sulla’s dictatorship first caused 
the Roman people to view the office as a tyranny. 
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The third reference to a Carthaginian dictator comes from Sextus Iulius Frontinus, who 
wrote in the first century A.D.  At Str. 2.1.4 Frontinus advises commanders not to give battle 
until the circumstances suited them.  He relates a story, also from the First Punic War, in which 
the Roman consul L. Postumius Megellus was surrounded by a Carthaginian army in Sicily and 
devised an effective counterattack to break the siege.  Frontinus refers to dictatores 
Carthaginiensium commanding Carthaginian forces.  The fact that he employs the plural 
dictatores underlines the point that he uses the term broadly.  Frontinus’ background, moreover, 
is important.  He was a Roman magistrate and military commander.  As an officer and author of 
a monograph on military strategy, Frontinus likely had a better understanding of the Roman 
military system than most Romans.  One may wonder how a Roman audience would have 
received his use of the title dictator in the first century A.D.  It is possible that the source from 
which Frontinus learned of Postumius’ campaign used dictatores Carthaginiensium and that he 
simply copied the usage.  In this case, the source could perhaps be traced back to Cato.  Given 
the theme of military instruction of Str., Frontinus was justifiably not concerned with explaining 
this use of dictator.  Nevertheless, it is tempting to think that Frontinus understood the term 
simply as military commander, as did Romans in the middle Republic. 
We should be cautious in thinking that these few references express the notion that all 
Romans of the middle Republic understood the term dictator as synonymous with military 
commander and that such a phenomenon can be pushed back into Roman ideas of the early 
Republic.  The references are insufficient to reconstruct exactly how these Carthaginian dictators 
performed their magistracies.  Nevertheless, Cato’s fragment and CIL 1.25 create a unique bridge 
back to Roman perceptions of the dictatorship before commentators of the later Republic gave 
rise to the idea of dictatorial supremacy.  What is more, the conspicuously public context for the 
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column of C. Duilius, in a place where all Romans could view the inscription, suggests that 
generic usage of the term dictator to denote a military commander was common register in the 
middle Republic. 
 
Conclusion 
However incomplete our understanding of dictatorships outside the Roman system, the 
Latin institutions discussed in this chapter trace a long tradition of the dictatorship as an 
administrative or provisional office.  Each example discussed above falls broadly into one of two 
categories: the dictators functioned as regular annual magistrates, military commanders, and, 
once they had been absorbed by Rome, chief priests; or they performed ad hoc military, religious, 
and diplomatic tasks.  In either case, the underlying feature of all these dictatorships is the fact 
that none of them exercised absolute power within their polities.  To place this within Roman 
views of magistracy, many Latin dictators assumed the duties of a Roman consul.  The historical 
precedent established by Latin uses of the dictatorship and by references to foreign military 
dictators in Roman authors compels us to reconcile our understanding of the early Roman 
dictatorship with these models.  The traditional notion that the Roman office possessed 
unrestricted imperium and was introduced only for emergency situations becomes an anomaly 
within Latium.  While it is certainly possible that the Romans borrowed the dictatorship from a 
Latin model and then adapted it as a supreme and emergency office, we should consider the 
possibility that in the early Republic the Roman dictatorship had greater affinity with the Latin 
office than has been traditionally conceded.  My argument that early Roman dictators were ad 
hoc military commanders (and later provisional magistrates for other tasks), possessing consular 
imperium and complementing consuls, fits this Latin paradigm well.  The few instances noted 
above in which Roman dictators are shown performing functions like their Latin counterparts 
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strengthens this theory.  Within this framework, I shall use the next chapters to demonstrate 
parity between Roman consular and dictatorial auspicia and imperium and introduce a series of 
salient examples from ancient narratives that explicate a provisional Roman military dictatorship 
in action. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE NATURE OF DICTATORIAL AUSPICIA AND IMPERIUM 
 
An examination of how other Latin communities used the office of dictator as an ordinary 
or restricted magistracy compels us to revisit the early version of the Roman dictatorship.  In 
order to examine the nature of the Roman dictatorship more thoroughly, we must look closely at 
the two underlying components of the office, auspicia and imperium.  This chapter will explore 
the character of dictatorial auspicia and imperium and evaluate it alongside consular auspicia 
and imperium.  The evidence presented here will demonstrate that the Romans conceived of 
parity between consular and dictatorial auspicia and imperium, and that, consequently, we 
should understand the two offices as analogous. 
 
Consular and Dictatorial Auspicia 
Auspicia denoted the seeking of divine approval before undertaking a major decision 
through a variety of methods of sacrifice.  The use of auspicia in connection with magistracy, 
however, became more complex.  Under the Republican system, auspicia were perhaps the most 
important component of a magistrate’s office.  In fact, we may say that a particular magistracy 
was predicated upon the specific auspicia connected with the rank of the office.  The consuls, as 
the senior magistrates in the Republican system, were entitled to the highest level of auspicia, 
and the importance of auspicia can be detected in three primary areas of the consulship.78  First, 
the election of consuls in the comitia centuriata was undertaken only after proper auspices were 
procured.  Second, suitable auspices had to be secured before the comitia curiata convened and 
bestowed imperium upon a newly elected consul.  Third, as the highest magistrates of the 
Republic, the consuls were responsible for performing the most important auspicia publica and 
                                                 
78.  Dumézil 1970: 595-610; Scullard 1982: 26-27; Rasmussen 2003: 149-168; Davies 2004: 72-73. 
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other religious ceremonies on behalf of the Roman people.  Clearly, auspicia were a salient 
feature of the consulship. 
In this section, I seek to explicate connections between consular and dictatorial auspicia 
in the period 501-300.  Specifically, I shall demonstrate that the same auspices that 
circumscribed the consulship also restricted the dictatorship.  As we shall see, dictatorial 
appointment occurred under a sitting consul’s auspicia, dictators were required to obtain their 
imperium under the same circumstances, and Roman tradition records instances in which 
dictators performed the same auspicia publica and other rituals as consuls did.  By tracing the 
auspicial links between consuls and dictators, it becomes clear that the Romans recognized the 
similarities between consular and dictatorial auspicia.  In short, if the Romans equipped dictators 
with the auspicia equal to that of the consuls, then the imperium granted under those auspicia 
should also be analogous.  We may thus begin to observe parity between consular and dictatorial 
imperium and, therefore, to establish a secure basis for the theory that the dictatorship was 
collegial with the consulship. 
The taking of auspicia occurred in many forms.  Livy captures their importance in 
Roman life with a speech attributed to Appius Claudius, who vehemently resisted plebeian 
access to the highest auspices (6.41.4-6): 
‘auspiciis hanc urbem conditam esse, auspiciis bello ac pace domi militiaeque omnia geri, quis est qui 
ignoret ? penes quos igitur sunt auspicia more maiorum ? nempe penes patres ; nam plebeius quidem 
magistratus nullus auspicato creatur ; nobis adeo propria sunt auspicia, ut non solum quos populus creat 
patricios magistratus non aliter quam auspicato creet sed nos quoque ipsi sine suffragio populi auspicato 
interregem prodamus et privatim auspicia habeamus, quae isti ne in magistratibus quidem habent.’  
 
‘Who is there who can deny that this city was founded with auspices, that everything in war and peace was 
done with auspices? With whom do the auspices rest, according to the customs of our ancestors? Of course 
with the senators; for, no plebeian magistrate is created with the taking of auspices. The auspices are our 
own to such an extent that not only do the people create patrician magistrates in no other way than by 
creating them with the taking of auspices, but even we ourselves appoint an interrex with the taking of 
auspices without a vote by the people and have all to ourselves the auspices, which [the plebeians] do not 
even have in their magistracies.’ 
 
The practice of augury, which is related to the word auspicia itself, and extispicy were 
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frequent means of auspices.79  In this section, I shall examine instances in which consuls and 
dictators engaged in taking auspices.  It is an important aspect of auspicial practice, and 
indicative of the great auspicial authority wielded by these senior magistrates, that consuls and 
dictators appear to have performed auspices personally.  Our sources suggest that an augur was 
often at hand in an advisory role and that the college of augurs routinely inspected auspices after 
the fact to ensure their validity.80 
The first important area for inquiry into the relation of consular and dictatorial auspicia 
falls under the purview of consular election and dictatorial appointment.  Consular elections took 
place in the comitia centuriata.  Livy records that this procedure was first implemented for the 
two consuls in 509 as prescribed by the constitution of Servius Tullius (1.60.3).  Obviously, 
Servius’ constitution did not foresee the election of consuls.  Nevertheless, Servius’ connection 
to the organization of the comitia centuriata and later attested instances of consular election by 
this assembly enabled Livy to make this claim.  Just as in other such important public events, this 
assembly convened only under favorable auspicia.  The magistrate presiding over the comitia 
went to the meeting place of the assembly on the Campus Martius during the night before the 
electoral session in order to secure the appropriate auspicia for the day’s proceedings.  Roman 
tradition maintains that the task of convening the comitia centuriata fell to consuls or dictators.81  
Aulus Gellius, claiming that he had access to earlier texts dealing with auspices, explains that the 
auspicial and electoral process had to be completed in a single day: the auspicia were to be 
performed after midnight and the comitia was to convene at midday (NA 3.2.10).  The presiding 
                                                 
79.  Augury included both scanning the flight of birds in the sky and consultation of omens by examining 
how vigorously the sacred chickens (pulli) ate corn.  See Vaahtera 2001: 94-143; Rasmussen 2003: 174-182; and 
Rosenberger 2007: 298-300.  For a discussion of extispicy, see Rasmussen 2003: 117-148; and Scheid 2003: 123-
124. 
80.  Scullard 1982: 29; North 1989: 584-585; Scheid 2003: 136; Davies 2004: 72-73. 
81.  Liebeschuetz 1996: 2-3; Stewart 1998: 97-111; Scheid 2003: 112-116; Rosenberger 2007: 298-300. 
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magistrate was also responsible for keeping lookout for ill omens, such as lightning, that could 
potentially appear while the comitia was engaged in the election process.82 
The voting procedure of the comitia centuriata was held under the highest level of 
auspicia.  Aulus Gellius reports that the auspices of the centuriate assembly were superior 
(maiora) since the senior magistrates were elected there (NA 13.15.1-7).83  He adds that even 
though praetors and censors were also elected in the comitia centuriata, consular auspicia were 
on a higher level.  Varro recounts a story that sheds further light upon the importance of the 
assembly’s auspicia (LL 6.91).  In this case, the assembly was engaged in legislation rather than 
magisterial election, but the example is informative.  A quaestor was to preside over a meeting 
of the comitia but his office was not equipped with authority sufficient to perform the auspicia 
maiora required to open a session.  Consequently, he had to appeal to one of the consuls to take 
auspices and actually convene the assembly.  Even in a non-electoral capacity, the comitia 
centuriata was associated with Rome’s highest auspicia. 
The auspicia were also vulnerable to political corruption.84  Our ancient sources record 
two later events in which the magistrate presiding over an election in the comitia centuriata 
claimed to have observed an ill omen whenever it became clear that an unfavorable candidate 
was leading in the voting.  Such an omen prevented the election process from continuing, and a 
new vote was thus called at a later date.85  These political manipulations reveal that flawed 
auspicia and observation of omens during elections, whether genuine or contrived, were 
important to the conduct of the comitia centuriata.  The auspices of the comitia centuriata, 
                                                 
82.  Taylor 1966: 7-8, 62-63.  For general discussions on the development of the comitia centuriata, see 
Botsford 1909: 201-228; Abbott 1911: 253-259; Staveley 1972: 123-129; and Lintott 1999: 55-61.  For the 
connection between the comitia centuriata and auspicia, see Varro LL 6.91; Livy 1.36.6; Cic. Leg. 3.11; Staveley 
1972: 149-150; Lintott 1999: 102-104; and Stewart 1998: 100-102. 
83.  This passage contains a reference to the augural book of M. Messala.  
84.  Liebeschuetz 1996: 25-26; and Rosenberger 2007: 300-303. 
85.  Staveley 1972: 207. 
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moreover, were clearly the highest electoral auspices in Rome, since the consuls elected there 
were the Republic’s senior magistrates. 
While the consuls won election through a comitia, dictators obtained their position 
through appointment by one of the consuls.  Nevertheless, the procedure outlining this 
appointment was conventional, and ancient sources portray the event as typical rather than 
exceptional.  There are certain details involving the appointment process that suggest to us that 
the auspicial concept of dictatorial selection was equivalent to consular election. 
For consular appointment of a dictator, we can note parallels to consular election by the 
comitia centuriata.  For instance, Livy records that in 327 the college of augurs, serving as an 
auspicial advisory committee, found that a dictatorial appointment that took place in a Roman 
camp in Samnium was flawed.  The plebeian tribunes suspected that the appointment was 
vitiated only because the dictator was a plebeian.  They concluded that all the proper procedures 
had been followed, including the fact that the consul had undertaken the appointment after 
midnight (8.23.10-17).  A dictatorial appointment in 310 was also undertaken at night: nocte 
deinde silentio, ut mos est (Livy 9.38.14).  The stipulation that auspicia and dictatorial 
appointment took place at night provides a correlation to the midnight auspicial procedure 
preceding consular election in the comitia centuriata.  It is important to note that the major 
distinction here is that dictators were actually appointed at night rather than during the day, as in 
consular electoral procedure.  This distinction may be explained by the fact that, since there was 
no actual electoral process, there was little need to wait until the following day to make the 
formal appointment of the dictator.  Dictatorial appointment at night, completed at the same time 
that the auspicia were performed, was thus a matter of expediency, and this procedure does not 
undermine the conceptual link between the auspicia under which the Romans elected consuls 
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and sitting consuls appointed dictators.  It may also be plausible to understand that the consul 
selected to appoint a dictator was viewed as the embodiment of the comitia centuriata, since a 
consul exercised authority over this assembly. 
Instances of vitiated dictatorial appointments also reveal the auspicial feature of the 
process.  On at least five occasions in the fourth century, dictators were compelled to resign 
because the college of augurs found some irregularity in their appointment.86  While ancient 
sources offer no details on the nature of these vitia, the emphasis on correct auspices for 
dictatorial selection is clear.   
Underlying the appointment process was a conceptual linking of consular and dictatorial 
election-selection auspicia.  When a consul enlisted a dictator, he did so under his own auspicia.  
These auspicia, derived from the consul’s election in the comitia centuriata, were the highest in 
the Roman polity.  Therefore, the consul’s auspicia for appointing a dictator were an extension 
of those under which the comitia centuriata elected consuls.  This notion of the consul bestowing 
his own auspicia onto a dictator brings up a contentious discussion.  Brennan has proposed that 
no Roman magistrate was capable of granting to another magistrate authority equal to or greater 
than his own.  A magistrate, therefore, could only confer a lesser form of imperium.87  Aulus 
Gellius supports this view (NA 13.15.1-7).  Livy, moreover, asserts that military tribunes with 
consular authority, considered by most scholars to have wielded lesser imperium than consuls, 
did not possess sufficient auspicia and imperium to appoint a dictator: only a consul was 
equipped to make such appointments (4.31.3).  According to this framework, the dictator would 
thus take possession of no more than consular imperium and perhaps even a lesser form.  The 
                                                 
86.  Livy 6.38; 8.15; 8.17; 8.23; 9.7.  The consular fasti record vitiated dictatorial appointments for the 
years 368, 321, and twice in 320.  
87.  Brennan 2000a: 36-37; and Linderski 1990: 45.  Brennan 2004: 38 notes the deficient potestas of 
military tribunes. 
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many connections being made here between consular and dictatorial auspicia and imperium 
make the diminished imperium option less likely.  The most logical conclusion is that consular 
and dictatorial auspicia and imperium were related: the commonalities in the two forms of 
auspicia make this clear.   
This portrayal of dictatorial appointments suggests that the Romans attempted to simulate 
consular election in the process of selecting a dictator as much as possible within the restrictions 
of appointment versus election.  Conceptually, at least to observers in the Late Republic, the 
auspicia under which consuls were elected were replicated in the appointment of a dictator.  
Simply put, parity existed between the two forms of auspicia. 
A magistrate’s auspicia and imperium were interdependent and connected on two levels.  
First, the rank of a magistrate’s imperium was contingent upon the source from which he derived 
authority.  Following election in the comitia centuriata, the consul was required to formally 
receive his imperium from the comitia curiata.  This assembly, perhaps the oldest advisory-
legislative body in the Roman polity, passed a lex curiata de imperio granting imperium to the 
consul.88  Cicero insists that a consul could not undertake any military activities until he obtained 
a lex curiata (Leg. agr. 2.30).  The auspices emerge once again in this process.  Roman practice 
stipulated that acceptable auspicia must be obtained before the session of the comitia curiata 
commenced.  In this process we see a direct connection with dictatorial authority.  After 
successful appointment by a consul, a new dictator was required to convene the comitia curiata 
and oversee the passage of his own lex curiata de imperio.  Before this session of the assembly 
began, proper auspicia had to be secured.  Dictators appear to have been able to perform their 
own auspicia for the gathering in which they received their imperium.  They acquired this power 
                                                 
88.  For an outline of the development and jurisdiction of the comitia curiata, including its position of 
prominence in the archaic period, see Botsford 1909: 168-200; Abbott 1911: 252-253; Staveley 1972: 122-123; and 
Lintott 1999: 49-55. 
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presumably from the auspices involved in their appointment.89  W. Smith proposed that there 
was no separate event for acquiring the right to auspices, implying that the dictator received the 
capability as soon as he was appointed under the consul’s auspices.90  This practice is further 
supported by the various dictatorial appointments comitiorum habendorum causa (for the 
purpose of holding elections) made while consuls were out of Rome: who else in the city had the 
power to convene the comitia curiata?91  Livy recounts the instance of a dictator in the Second 
Samnite War who had to take auspices twice before gaining his imperium, after the first attempt 
was flawed by an ill omen (9.38.15-16).  The fact that dictators had the ability to take auspices 
for the very session of the comitia curiata that gave them imperium is the single distinction 
between consular and dictatorial acquisition of authority.  For newly elected consuls, it was 
typical for one of the outgoing consuls to perform the auspices and convene the comitia.  This 
was not always possible in the case of dictators.  In fact, the primary reason a dictator was 
employed in the first place was because both consuls were detained elsewhere.  The fact that a 
dictator could manage these auspicia appears to be more a result of expediency than 
extraordinary authority.  
According to this reconstruction of how a dictator received his imperium, there is a clear 
link between consular and dictatorial imperium, since both types of magistrate derived their 
authority from a similar source under mutual auspicia.  The same power-granting motion, 
conveyed by the lex curiata de imperio, moreover, underscores parity between consular and 
dictatorial imperium.  The precise history of the lex curiata is obscure, but we may be relatively 
confident that our sources have faithfully recorded the phrase lex curiata in relation to both 
                                                 
89.  Brennan 2000a: 38. 
90.  Smith 1901: 255. 
91.  The consular fasti for the period 501-300 register dictators comitiorum habendorum causa for the years 
351, 350, 349, 348, 335, 327, 321, and 306.  
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consuls and dictators obtaining imperium.  The terminology for this lex is registered in later 
literary sources, and it is likely that these references preserve the existence of the procedure in 
the early Republic.92  Even if Livy, for example, did not understand the full ramifications of or 
the precise details involving the lex curiata, we can assume that he was capable of copying such 
terminology from an earlier source.  Finally, since the comitia curiata passed laws granting 
imperium in the late Republic, it is likely that this was one of its traditional functions. 
  The fact that a dictator called a special meeting of the comitia curiata to obtain imperium 
does not make his imperium greater than a consul’s.  In fact, this ad hoc meeting for the dictators 
is analogous with the annual practice of the comitia curiata formally granting imperium to 
consuls.  Let us consider a separate but useful case.  Along with consuls and dictators, praetors 
received their imperium from the comitia curiata, though likely in a separate session 
accompanied by lesser auspicia.93  There has emerged a theory that praetorian imperium was 
minus and consular maius.94  I accept this argument, at least within the context of the middle 
Republic.  Consular and praetorian imperia thus represent the high and low ends of the spectrum 
of imperium that the comitia curiata was capable of bestowing.  The fact that consuls and 
praetors obtained their imperium from the same assembly may have an important implication on 
the nature of dictatorial imperium.  Two interpretations can be made here.  First, and less likely, 
dictators may have received a sort of imperium minus similar to that given to praetors.  It is 
interesting to note that in the third century, when the praetorship became fully developed, 
praetors began performing many of the functions that were undertaken by dictators in the fifth 
                                                 
92.  For example, Livy 5.46.11; and Cic. Att. 4.17.2.  See Staveley 1956: 84-90, and 1972: 123; Bauman 
1973: 34-47; Lintott 1999: 28-29, 49, 103; and Brennan 2000a: 18-20. 
93.  Aul. Gell. NA 13.15.1-7; cf. Livy 5.46.11 on a lex curiata for a dictator. 
94.  Brennan 2000a: 25-30 outlines traditional views on different grades of imperium; cf. Stewart 1998: 
211-219. 
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and fourth centuries.95  The second option is that dictatorial imperium was equivalent to the 
higher form of consular imperium, while praetorian imperium was slightly more deficient than 
the other two.  Given the fact that dictators performed consular duties both in a military and civic 
context in the period 501-300, I propose that the lex curiata de imperio expresses parity between 
consular and dictatorial imperium.  At any rate, there is no reason and no procedural evidence 
that the comitia curiata could allot exceptional imperium to a dictator under any exceptional 
auspices.  Furthermore, maius and minus are comparative adjectives and therefore do not allow 
for a tertius form of imperium.  Consequently, dictatorial imperium must be either maius, like 
consuls, or minus, like praetors.  In the absence of such constitutional evidence we must look to 
observable actions, such as how dictators performed their office in relation to consuls.  As we 
shall see in a later chapter, the idea of parity between the two forms of imperium is borne out by 
such an examination. 
 A further point should be made here.  The inclusion of praetors in a modern 
reconstruction of the procedure of the comitia curiata indicates that the system is likely no 
earlier than the third century, the period when the praetorship began to develop fully.  Such a 
reconstruction may even be as late as the second or first centuries, since the bulk of references to 
procedure date from Cicero’s lifetime.  We should thus be careful in placing too much weight on 
this system.  Even so, if we omit the praetorship from the assembly’s procedure in the early 
Republic, during which period it was plausibly in use, we are left with the comitia curiata 
granting only consular and dictatorial imperium.  Under such a system, it becomes easier to 
understand the procedure for giving equivalent imperium to both consuls and dictators.  If the 
term imperium minus developed specifically to denote praetorian imperium, then the only form 
                                                 
95.  For magisterial lists for the third century, see Broughton 1951a.  See Brennan 2000a: 58-97 on the 
development of praetorian competences down to the year 219. 
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of imperium that existed earlier in the comitia curiata was maius.  In short, consuls and dictators 
had access to only one form of imperium in the early Republic. 
The principal implication of the lex curiata de imperio is that the Romans, at least those 
reconstructing the assembly’s origins in the later Republic, saw parity in the forms of consular 
and dictatorial imperium.  Both forms were derived from the comitia curiata, despite the fact that 
the procedure for obtaining imperium was different.  Consuls obtained imperium annually, but 
while the comitia curiata granted power to dictators less frequently, the procedure was hardly 
rare.  For both magistrates, the same form of auspicia provided the basis for obtaining power.  
The second level of association between auspicia and imperium was characterized by the 
level of public sacrifices and other rituals which a magistrate’s imperium entitled him to perform.  
Consuls wielded the highest imperium in the Republic, and, therefore, it fell to them to take the 
most important auspicia publica.  The auspicial ceremonies were conducted on a variety of 
occasions and permeated the civic aspect of the consul’s station.  I shall present examples of 
consular sacrifices for which we can match parallel activities undertaken by dictators.  The fact 
that the two magistrates performed the same public auspices provides another point of contact in 
our expanding model of consular and dictatorial parity. 
As we have already seen, consuls managed the auspices for both the comitia centuriata 
and comitia curiata, the major legislative and electoral bodies of the early Republican system, 
and they had the task of taking auspices before convening a meeting of the senate.  Dictators 
assumed these duties whenever necessary.  For instance, the consular fasti register numerous 
appointments of dictators comitiorum habendorum causa.96  This appellation confirms that 
dictators, whenever they appeared in a civic context, exercised the same auspicial authority in 
terms of administering assemblies.  An examination of dictatorial involvement in civic affairs 
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will be developed below.  Moreover, numerous other public sacrifices fell within the purview of 
the consulship.  At the beginning of the administrative year, in March during the early Republic, 
one of the consuls led other magistrates from Rome and many Latin communities into the Alban 
hills in order to perform sacrifices (feriae Latinae) at the temple of Jupiter Latiaris.  According to 
Roman tradition, this ceremony was shared by the members of the Latin League until the period 
in which Rome came to dominate the alliance.  Thereafter, a Roman consul made the sacrifices.  
Livy offers an account of this ritual, in which an ill omen forced the consul to reschedule the 
feriae for a later date (41.16.1-6).  When both consuls were detained in the field, the duty of 
performing the feriae Latinae fell to a Roman dictator.97  The consular fasti, in fact, contain 
entries of dictators appointed feriarum Latinarum causa (for the purpose of performing the Latin 
sacrifices) in the years 344 and 257.  It would be no surprise if dictators appointed for other 
purposes (e.g., rei gerundae causa) performed the ritual in the Alban hills incidentally whenever 
the consuls were gone on campaign.  What is more, the consular fasti contain the name of a 
dictator appointed for managing the ludi Romani in 322.  Livy says explicitly that a praetor was 
intended to supervise these games, but that a dictator was appointed for the task when the 
magistrate fell ill (8.40.2-5).  
Dictators shared other public ceremonies with consuls.  At 7.3.1-9 Livy reports that in 
363 L. Manlius Capitolinus Imperiosus was appointed dictator clavi figendi causa, the ritual in 
which a magistrate drove a nail in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus in order to ward off 
pestilence.  In this account, Livy wades through a shadowy tradition in which this ritual was 
originally performed by the praetor maximus, whom Livy appears to equate with a consul, and 
later by a dictator.  The consular fasti also record a dictator clavi figendi causa for the years 331 
and 263.  These episodes denote a link between consular and dictatorial access to the same 
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auspices.  Finally, Servius Auctus preserves a tradition in which consuls, praetors, and dictators 
made the sacrifices to the penates and the goddess Vesta at Lavinium before they ended their 
terms in office (...quod cum consules et praetores sive dictator abeunt magistratu, Lavini sacra 
penatibus simul et Vestae faciunt, ...when consuls and praetors, or a dictator, leave office, they 
perform sacrifices to the penates and Vesta at Lavinium, ad Aen. 2.296.8-9).98  Servius’ use of 
et...sive may imply that the end of term for consuls and praetors was coeval, while the end of a 
dictator’s term did not necessarily coincide. 
The connections outlined above express the notion that the Romans observed a link 
between auspicia – in all of their uses – pertaining to consuls and dictators.  As we have seen, in 
the various rituals that developed around dictatorial appointment, granting of imperium, and 
public sacrifices, the Romans strove to replicate established auspicial procedures involving the 
consulship.  It may be suggested that, in terms of the all-important auspicia, the dictatorship was 
patterned closely upon the consulship.  
 
Consular and Dictatorial Imperium Militiae 
The civic responsibilities of consuls and dictators have already been examined at length.  
In this section, I seek to explore further the nature of consular and dictatorial imperium domi and 
to connect consular and dictatorial imperium in a military context.  A consul’s activities in the 
sphere domi included a range of civic duties within the boundaries of Rome, while military 
affairs outside the city characterized the consular sphere militiae.  I shall demonstrate that 
enforcement or suspension of two closely related principles distinguished consular imperium 
domi from imperium militiae.  Intercessio was opposition from the other consul, who exercised 
equal imperium, or from one of the plebeian tribunes, who could invoke a sacred veto to which a 
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consul was obligated to yield.99  Plebeian tribunes appear to have possessed this power from an 
early period in the Republic.  Provocatio, a concept related to intercessio, enabled a condemned 
Roman citizen to appeal to the people (provocatio ad populum) for leniency against punishment 
from a consul.100  Simply put, when a consul operated within the civic sphere he was bound by 
intercessio and provocatio, while within a military context these principles did not obstruct his 
imperium, thus making the consul’s military authority greater than his authority domi.101 
After establishing the impact of intercessio and provocatio on consular imperium, I shall 
trace their implications for the Romans’ concept of dictatorial imperium.  For the first century 
and a half of the Republic, dictators were employed exclusively as military commanders 
intended to supplement the consuls or military tribunes.  The consequence of this purely military 
character is that there was no logical need for the Romans to develop an extraordinary form of 
imperium maius for a dictator whose military function was satisfied with consular imperium 
militiae, itself a supreme form of imperium.  In time, the Romans introduced the dictatorship into 
the civic sphere, and for the first time had to consider the limits of dictatorial imperium domi.  As 
we shall see, they imposed a series of restrictions on a dictator’s power within the city in order to 
make the office function like the consulship domi.  In both domi and militiae contexts, then, we 
can observe that the Romans conceived of parity between consular and dictatorial imperium. 
When a consul performed his duties within the city of Rome, his imperium was restricted 
by the constitutional precepts of intercessio and provocatio.  In actual practice, an intercessio 
functioned as a veto of a consular act.  An intercessio could be invoked, however, only by a 
                                                 
99.  Abbott 1911: 154-156, 198-199 cites examples of the use of intercessio in the late Republic.  See also 
Lintott 1999: 32-33.  Livy records an instance in which a plebeian tribune invoked his power of intercessio to block 
the levy of plebeian troops (2.43). 
100.  von Fritz 1954: 214-215; Lintott 1999: 33, 97-99. 
101.  Polybius 6.12 outlines consular authority in the field; Walbank 1957: 675-678.  Cicero Leg. 3.6 
makes clear that the right of provocatio applied only to a magistrate’s imperium domi. 
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magistrate of equal rank or by the tribunes of the plebs.  Therefore, a consul was vulnerable to 
the veto of his colleague or a plebeian tribune.102  Livy records that the tribunes frustrated 
consular levies in the fifth century by use of intercessio (4.55.1-3).  Similarly, the right of 
provocatio enabled a condemned Roman citizen to appeal to the people for leniency or to 
complain of an unjust trial.  Our sources record that a law dealing with provocatio was passed in 
the early Republic and was renewed several times as a defensive mechanism against oppressive 
senior magistrates.103  In actual practice, this appeal was directed at a plebeian tribune, who 
could then exercise his right of intercessio against an unfair punishment by a senior magistrate.  
The right must date back to the early Republic, since Cicero notes that it was registered in the 
laws of the Twelve Tables (Leg. 3.6).104  Livy places the first instance of provocatio in the 
aftermath of the battle of the Horatii and Curiatii (1.26.1-14).  Publius Horatius, the only 
combatant to have survived the battle, murdered his sister because of her grief over her fiancé, 
one of the enemy combatants whom Horatius had killed.  The Roman king Tullus Hostilius 
appointed a tribunal to try the crime, and the young Horatius was sentenced to death.  He 
appealed to the people for leniency, which was granted after a heartfelt speech by the youth’s 
father.  Livy reports a more reliable account of provocatio in the passage of a lex Valeria in 
around 300.  He declares that this law was the third renewal of the right to appeal to the people 
against capital punishment (10.9.3-6).105 
By contrast, a consul in his military capacity was equipped with a nearly unrestricted 
form of imperium.106  The threat of intercessio or provocatio was severely reduced because a 
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consul was accompanied by neither a colleague nor plebeian tribunes in the field.107  Cicero 
characterizes a consul’s imperium militiae in this way: militiae ab eo qui imperabit provocatio 
nec esto, quodque is qui bellum geret imperassit, ius ratumque esto (Let there be no right of 
provocatio from he who will have imperium in the field, and let whatever he who wages war has 
commanded be right and authoritative, Leg. 3.6.7-9).  The language used here implies that Cicero 
extracted this phrase from an archaic source.108  In terms of the unquestioned authority of a 
commander, Mommsen suggested that Roman criminal law developed from the recognition that 
civil law should be different from ‘arbitrary rule of military command in the field.’109  Roman 
tradition offers numerous examples that characterize the supremacy of a consul’s imperium 
militiae.  Dionysius recalls that in a battle against the Volsci in the early fifth century, a number 
of Roman units fled before engaging the enemy.  Once back in camp, the consul Appius 
Claudius ordered the beheading of all the centurions of the offending centuries.  Dionysius 
reports that officers in camp pleaded with the consul not to commit this act (Ant. Rom. 9.50.2-7).  
Livy recounts a similar version, interjecting the detail that Appius felt free to brutalize his troops 
all the more because the tribunes could not restrain him as they had within the civic sphere: 
eadem in militia saevitia Appi quae domi esse, liberior quod sine tribuniciis vinculis erat 
(2.58.4).  Livy also preserves the didactic tale in which the consul T. Manlius Torquatus 
supervised the beheading of his own son, who had disobeyed the consul’s orders by leading an 
unauthorized cavalry charge during a battle in the Latin War (8.7.1-8.8.2).  The immense 
authority characterized by these tales expresses the supremacy of the consul’s imperium militiae.  
It is difficult to see how a dictator would have needed anything more than this form of imperium. 
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Given the character of consular imperium militiae and its implication for the authority of 
the dictatorship, it will be useful to underscore the military function of the dictatorship in the 
period 501-300 at this point in the argument.  Of the twenty dictators listed in the consular fasti 
for the years 501-367, at least seventeen were registered as military commanders.  The standard 
notation for military function, rei gerundae causa, is repeated again and again.  Moreover, the 
biographical information extracted from literary narratives on early dictatorial appointments 
allows us to see that the men chosen as dictators were overwhelmingly veteran military men.110  
By the middle of the fourth century, however, the Romans introduced the dictatorship 
into domestic affairs.  Consequently, dictatorial power had to be defined for the first time within 
the sphere domi.  The pattern for this circumscribed authority was consular imperium domi.  
Three key episodes from the early Republic illustrate this move toward aligning the power of the 
dictatorial imperium with consular imperium.  First, in 325 the Romans were engaged in the 
early years of the Second Samnite War.  That year, L. Papirius Cursor had been appointed 
dictator, with Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus as magister equitum.  Contrary to the dictator’s 
orders, Fabius attacked and defeated a Samnite army while the dictator was away.  According to 
Livy, Papirius, driven in part by jealousy over Fabius’ stunning victory, ordered his master of the 
horse back to Rome to stand trial for his disobedience (8.30.1-8.35.12).  One must wonder why 
the dictator did not mete out punishment in camp, where he had the full force of consular-level 
imperium militiae behind him.  Instead, a lengthy trial ensued back in Rome, during which 
Papirius militated against several supporters of Fabius.  In the end, Fabius’ father made a formal 
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provocatio, asking the tribunes to reconsider his son’s position (tribunos plebis appello et 
provoco ad populum, 8.33.7).  The dictator was compelled to yield, and Fabius was released.111  
The right of provocatio is also relevant for the second example.  As we have seen, Livy (10.9.3-6) 
and Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 5.19.3-5) agree that the Romans passed a lex Valeria de provocatione 
in 300.  This latest iteration ostensibly reaffirmed the right of appeal for the Roman citizens.  
Some scholars, beginning with Mommsen, propose that the lex Valeria of 300 applied to 
dictators as well as other magistrates.112  If this theory is correct, dictatorial imperium, so often 
characterized as supreme, becomes aligned precisely with consular imperium, at least in the 
realm of provocatio.  The third example is the infamous dictatorship in 363 of L. Manlius 
Capitolinus Imperiosus.  Livy records that Manlius’ appointment was strictly clavi figendi causa 
(7.3.1-9).  According to the consular fasti, his role as a religious dictator was the first such 
appointment.  Upon completion of driving the nail into the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, 
Manlius attempted to levy an army, clearly driven by his understanding of the dictatorship as a 
military office.  In the end, however, the senators convinced Manlius to give up his plan and 
relinquish the dictatorship by invoking the mos maiorum.  As Hartfield emphasizes throughout 
her dissertation on the Roman dictatorship, mos was a key force in keeping all magistrates in 
line.113  In this anecdote we see the first instance in which the Romans were compelled to define 
dictatorial imperium within a civic context, previously having no need to classify a military 
dictatorship equipped with consular imperium militiae.  Nearly all previous dictatorships had 
been intended for a military purpose and had been equipped with unrestricted imperium.114 
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When we examine dictatorial imperium alongside consular imperium, we see that in both 
a military and civic context, the Romans conceived of parity between the two forms of authority.  
In either case, dictatorial imperium is patterned on already existing parameters of consular 
imperium.  I shall use the next chapter to introduce a series of salient examples from ancient 
narratives that explicate further a provisional Roman dictatorship, equipped with consular 
imperium, in action. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 THE ORIGINAL FORM OF THE ROMAN DICTATORSHIP, 501-300 B.C. 
 
I have demonstrated thus far that, contrary to traditional accounts, Roman dictatorial 
imperium did not exceed consular imperium in the period 501-300.  Conceptual links showing 
the equivalence of consular and dictatorial imperium and each office’s use of auspicia can be 
observed in many areas of administration in the early Roman Republic.  What is more, we have 
already seen the use of the dictatorship in other Italic cities and ostensibly in Carthage as an 
ordinary or ad hoc magistracy, practices that support a reassessment of the nature of the Roman 
dictatorship.  In this chapter, I turn to reconstructions of specific Roman dictatorships from the 
early Republic that demonstrate the original function of the office.  I shall offer a selection of 
ancient literary passages that discuss dictators performing their office as an equal colleague of 
the consuls and on a provisional basis.  Wherever possible, moreover, I shall consider relevant 
epigraphic evidence.  This reconstruction, based upon conclusions drawn from the previous 
chapters of this thesis, is the full expression of my revised model of the early dictatorship as a 
magistracy equivalent to the consulship. 
Ancient literary sources of the later Republic and early Augustan era characterize the 
dictatorship as a supremely powerful office.  As has already been argued here, such depictions of 
the institution itself are not consistent with actual dictatorial appointments that are recorded in 
literary and epigraphic sources.  The frequency with which the Romans of the early Republic 
appointed dictators, and the various tasks for which appointments were made, hardly imply 
cautious use of a potent and guarded office.  Raw data from the consular fasti demonstrate 
usage.115  They record that the dictatorship was used nine times in the period 465-400.  From the 
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beginning of the fourth century to the outbreak of the Second Samnite War in 327, thirty 
dictatorships are reported.  We even see dictatorships in consecutive years on seven occasions, 
and from 353-348 the consular fasti record a run of six dictatorial years in a row.  During the 
twenty-three years of the Second Samnite War, which will be discussed at length later in this 
chapter, the Romans used the dictatorship seventeen times, including two years with multiple 
dictators.116  Another prominent feature of traditional portrayals of the dictatorship, moreover, 
was that the office was reserved for emergency situations.  Once again, actual usage does not 
match this characterization.  In this chapter, I shall offer examples that indicate that employment 
of the dictatorship was contingent not upon a military emergency but rather upon the fact that the 
two consuls were unable to fulfill all necessary consular tasks.  
The statistics given above represent a discrepancy between the notion of the dictatorship 
as a supreme institution and actual Roman usage of the office.  In the previous two chapters, we 
have seen how analyses of consular and dictatorial auspicia and imperium and comparison of the 
Roman office with Latin usage of the dictatorship begin to cast doubt on the traditional model of 
the Roman dictatorship in the early Republic.  Let us now turn our attention to a series of salient 
examples of individual dictatorships from the period 501-300.  These examples are indicative of 
a dictatorship that was an office collegial with the consulship and was implemented on an ad hoc 
basis for a specific function domi or militiae. 
 
Dictators as Military Colleagues of Consuls 
Three dictatorships in particular demonstrate that in the early Republic dictators operated 
in conjunction with the pair of consuls.  In each case, the dictatorial appointment was undertaken 
expressly because the two consuls could not manage military fronts beyond those in which they 
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were already deployed. 
Our literary sources and the consular fasti record that in the year 494, Manius Valerius 
Maximus was appointed dictator for the purpose of settling a potential secession of the 
plebeians.117  Hartfield has noted, however, that within the sources there is a clear indication that 
this dictator’s role in mitigating plebeian dissension was secondary to an appointment rei 
gerundae causa, or for the management of a war.118  Livy (2.30.3) and Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 
6.34.1-6.42.3) allude to the fact that lurking behind fears that the plebeians might secede was the 
fact that Rome was being threatened by three separate enemy incursions.  The conventional 
narrative records that the dictator Valerius first set about addressing plebeian grievances and then 
levied a massive army.  Livy (2.30.7) says that each of the consuls, Aulus Verginius and Titus 
Vetusius, took command of three legions each and that the dictator received four legions.  At 
once, the three commanders set off on three separate missions: Vetusius drove the Aequi out of 
Latium, Verginius won a major victory over the Volsci, and the dictator Valerius routed an army 
of Sabines.119  Dionysius records that the dictator earned a triumph for his part in the year’s 
military successes (Ant. Rom. 6.43.1), and Livy is explicit that this triumph was awarded because 
the dictator’s victory was the most impressive, not simply because he was dictator: post pugnam 
ad Regillum lacum non alia illis annis pugna clarior fuit. dictator triumphans urbem invehitur 
(No other battle in the years since Lake Regillus was more famous. The dictator was carried into 
the city in triumph, 2.31.3).  It is worth noting that during the period 501-300 dictators triumphed 
twenty times, according to literary accounts and the fasti triumphales.120  The fact that dictators 
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were allowed to celebrate triumphs offers another point of contact with consular imperium. 
Several interesting points emerge from this story.  I interpret this dictatorship as simply a 
supplement to the pair of consulships: the two consuls could not possibly have fought against 
three disparate enemies.  A third commander with consular imperium militiae was thus needed, 
and this void was filled by a dictatorial appointment.  Even within the confusion about the 
dictator managing civic affairs, this appointment has the clear overtones of a military 
appointment.  There are, moreover, no indications that the two consuls and the dictator 
coordinated their military efforts at all.  Perhaps we are to assume that the three simply drew lots 
in order to assign each magistrate to a province.  It should also be added that hostilities with the 
Aequi and Sabines, at least, appear to have been part of an annual cycle of warfare.  If we look 
back into the years before 494, we see frequent incursions into Latin territory by both tribes.  In 
other words, the incursions of 494 likely came as little surprise to the Romans and hardly 
constituted a military emergency.  Finally, Livy adds two details that allow us to gain a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between the dictator Valerius and the consuls.  First, Livy 
implies that the three senior magistrates remained in the field with their respective armies after 
repelling the earlier attacks (2.31.4-6).  In particular, a force of Aequi posed a new threat.  The 
army of the consul Veturius accused their commander of delaying his attack so that the dictator’s 
term in office would expire before the campaign began.  Ostensibly, the consul’s delaying tactic 
was intended to frustrate the dictator’s reassessment of plebeian grievances back in Rome.  
Consequently, the soldiers in the consular army would remain under arms and therefore play no 
role in plebeian dissension back in Rome before the dictator’s term ended.  The point to take 
from this episode, if Livy’s interpretation is correct, is that the consul was engaging in an 
antagonistic political action against the dictator rather than obediently following a more powerful 
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magistrate.  Second, Livy notes that the Roman soldiers were not likely to break their military 
oaths by disbanding their units, even if they were angered by the anti-plebeian actions of the 
consul (2.32.1-2).  Significantly, the soldiers had sworn their oaths directly to the consuls.  Had 
the dictator been considered the supreme magistrate for the duration of the term, he would have 
administered the oaths.  
The year 458 was marked by one of the most celebrated dictatorships in Roman history.  
Roman tradition fondly recalled how L. Quinctius Cincinnatus dutifully undertook a dictatorship, 
won a great victory, and promptly laid down his office to return to his fields.121  Even so, there 
are inconsistencies within literary accounts of Cincinnatus’ term that betray the form of his 
authority as equivalent to that of the consuls.  In this year, C. Nautius Rutilus and L. Minucius 
Esquilinus entered the consulship.  The senate dispatched Minucius to confront yet another 
incursion into Latin territory by the Aequi.  At the same time, a huge force of Sabines attacked 
the area just northeast of Rome, posing what may be interpreted as an emergency.  In response, 
the consul Nautius led an army to confront the Sabines and repelled the attack after a series of 
skirmishes.  Minucius, on the other hand, found his camp besieged by the Aequian army.  It was 
at this point that the Romans decided to appoint Cincinnatus as dictator to relieve the siege of 
Minucius’ camp.  The narratives of both Livy and Dionysius are clear about the sequence of 
events.  The dictatorial appointment was not made because of the Sabine threat, but rather to 
rescue the army of Minucius.  Dionysius claims that the consul Nautius rushed back to Rome in 
order to make the appointment of the dictator.  Livy’s version omits this detail, suggesting 
simply that Nautius was not up to the task of relieving the siege.  Within the ambiguity in Livy’s 
account, it is plausible that Nautius was occupied against the Sabines and a third senior 
magistrate was required.  The solution was thus the appointment of a dictator.  In fact, Livy 
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discloses later that Nautius continued his campaign against the Sabines, even moving into Sabine 
territory itself (3.29.7).  An alternative interpretation is possible, one that satisfies both Livy’s 
and Dionysius’ versions of the dictatorial appointment and also reveals a dictator filling the role 
of consul.  After he lifted the siege of the Roman camp, Cincinnatus essentially removed 
Minucius from his post and took command of the consul’s army.  Consequently, this situation 
could be an instance of a dictator replacing a consul, which may have been the motivation behind 
the initial dictatorial appointment.  What is more, there is no evidence that Minucius formally 
abdicated his consulship in a procedural concession to the dictator.  This anecdote, therefore, 
does not suggest that the dictator held imperium maius. 
One final example explicates the fact that the dictator only supplemented the consuls 
rather than directed them.  In 360, the consuls Gaius Poetelius Balbus and Marcus Fabius 
Ambustus were engaged in campaigns against the Tiburtines and Hernici, respectively.  
Simultaneously, a Gallic army, allied with the Tiburtines, and stationed in Campania, attacked a 
number of cities in southern Latium.  In response, the Romans appointed Quintus Servilius Ahala 
dictator rei gerundae causa to confront the Gallic threat.  The Romans enjoyed military success 
on all three fronts.  Ambustus defeated the army of the Hernici, Poetelius contained the Tiburtine 
threat, and the dictator Servilius drove the Gauls away from Rome.  In fact, Poetelius met and 
routed the Gallic army as it retreated toward Tibur.  The fasti triumphales record that the consul 
Poetelius celebrated a double triumph (geminum triumphum, Livy 7.11.9) and that the other 
consul Ambustus was entitled to an ovation.  Livy adds that the dictator had resigned his office, 
but it is unclear how much this fact had to do with the honors given to the consuls.  At any rate, 
the fact that the senate awarded a triumph to Poetelius runs counter to traditional views of the 
dictatorship as a supremely powerful office.  If this had been the case, the triumph would have 
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been awarded to the highest magistrate, under whose auspicia the campaigns were conducted.  
The consular triumph, then, lends itself to the notion that the dictator was not supreme and was 
simply a third senior magistrate meant to supplement the pair of consuls.  Record of this consular 
triumph must have jarred Livy’s typical impression that the dictatorship was a supreme office.  
Perhaps for this reason he interjected the detail that the dictator shifted the glory of the Gallic 
campaign to the consul Poetelius in order to rationalize record of the consular triumph: dictator 
consulibus in senatu et apud populum magnifice conlaudatis et suarum quoque rerum illis 
remisso honore dictatura se abdicavit (The dictator, after the consuls were praised splendidly in 
the senate and before the people and he had conceded to them [the consuls] the honor of his own 
deeds, abdicated his office, 7.11.9).  We should note that such an altruistic action by a dictator 
would surely be unique in the competitive environment of Roman politics.  Military glory was 
one of the best forms of political currency in Republican Rome, and no magistrate would forego 
such honors lightly.122 
In these examples, we can observe dictators serving as what can only be characterized as 
an additional consul.  In each instance, the dictator operates as a colleague of the consuls, 
generally campaigning independently against military threats. 
 
Dictatorships Comitiorum Habendorum Causa and for Religious Functions 
As we saw in the previous chapter, dictatorial competence included convening the 
comitia centuriata in the event that neither consul was present to undertake the task.  The 
supervision of consular elections in the comitia centuriata was ordinarily the domain of the 
consuls alone and was one of the principal elements of consular imperium domi.  The fact that 
dictators could be charged with election-holding offers a clear indication that dictatorial purpose 
                                                 
122.  On the Roman aristocracy, see Syme 1960: 12-27; and Rosenstein 1990: 1-8. 
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overlapped with consular tasks.  Each appointment of a dictator comitiorum habendorum causa, 
moreover, was prompted by the fact that the consuls were occupied in the field or by illness and 
unable to return to Rome to supervise elections.  In short, the ad hoc nature of this form of 
dictatorial usage, intended expressly for a consular task, reveals the nature of the early 
dictatorship as a magistracy equal to the consulship. 
One notable example from the fourth century will suffice to illustrate this form of 
dictatorial usage.  The consular fasti register that each year of the period 351-348 included a 
dictatorial appointment comitiorum habendorum causa.  In 350 a major Gallic invasion 
threatened Latium.123  One of the consuls, M. Popilius Laenas, levied an army and routed the 
Gallic army in battle.  Even so, the consul received a serious wound that delayed his celebration 
of a triumph.  Furthermore, the other consul had fallen ill before the Gallic campaign had begun, 
and he remained out of action for the entire year.  Consequently, the consul Popilius had 
assigned command of an army to a praetor, instructing him to defend Rome itself.  Additionally, 
with both consuls unable to hold elections – the one nursing a battle wound and the other 
lingering in sickness – L. Furius Camillus was appointed dictator for the purpose of convening 
the comitia centuriata.  Here, we see a praetor put in charge of a consular army, while the 
dictator fulfilled a different consular task.  This episode signals how the Romans used the 
dictatorship in the third century, that is, almost exclusively as an election-holding magistracy.124  
Conversely, praetors became increasingly involved in the command of armies in the third 
century.  The magisterial array of 350 indicates clearly that the dictatorship was the tool of 
choice to replace a consular function, in this case, management of elections.  It was perhaps the 
only tool available to the Roman polity, since dictators possessed the appropriate level of 
                                                 
123.  Livy 7.23.1-2. 
124.  See the consular fasti for third-century entries of dictators comitiorum habendorum causa.  
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imperium and auspicia to convene the comitia centuriata, whereas praetorian imperium was 
deficient in this area. 
We have also already encountered instances in which the Romans employed the 
dictatorship for religious tasks.  According to the consular fasti, such usage of the office occurred 
three times.125  In each instance, the dictator assumed responsibility for conducting certain rituals 
that were typically managed by a consul.  The infamous dictatorship of L. Manlius Capitolinus 
Imperiosus has been noted in previous chapters, but the story surrounding his appointment as 
dictator clavi figendi causa remains important here.  Livy gives the canonical version of the 
episode (7.3.1-9).  He attests that elderly Romans recalled a tradition in which an early praetor 
maximus ended a plague by driving a nail into the temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline.  He then 
notes that this task was assigned to consuls and finally to dictators.126  Imperiosus was the man 
chosen as dictator for this purpose in 363.  If we take Livy at face value here, it appears that the 
consuls did precisely nothing during this year.  He gives attention only to ongoing propitiations 
to the gods.  Nevertheless, total consular inactivity seems difficult to accept.  Some conjecture 
here may be useful.  At 7.1.3, Livy records that an army of Gauls was massing to the south of 
Rome and that the revolt of the Hernici was brewing.  We can thus be certain that the possibility 
or actual prosecution of warfare was present also in 363.  In fact, after he completed his 
appointed task of driving the nail, Imperiosus attempted to levy an army, according to Livy, in 
order to attack the Hernici.  Furthermore, the consuls of the following year engaged the Hernici, 
one of them being killed in battle.  If, then, there was a Hernician military threat in 363, not to 
mention the impending Gallic presence, we may presume that the two consuls were stationed in 
                                                 
125.  Lydus (Mag. 138) alone records a dictator clavi figendi causa for 463, agreeing with Livy’s reference 
to a dictator for this function a century prior to L. Manlius Capitolinus Imperiosus in 363 (7.3). 
126.  The theory that two praetors were the original chief magistrates in the early Republic was first 
developed by Mommsen.  For a recent overview of research on this subject, see Brennan 2000a: 20-25. 
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the field.  This would be consistent with regular Roman military practice of most years during 
the early Republic.  Consequently, it is plausible to understand that the consuls were away from 
Rome, so a substitute was needed to perform a task reserved for a magistrate with adequate 
imperium.127  The selection of a dictator for a consular task appears fluid in this episode.  One 
final note on Imperiosus’ dictatorship must be made.  Military action by a dictator was expected, 
since it was previously the primary function of dictators.  Imperiosus, then, was not being 
tyrannical but was simply following conventional understanding of the dictatorship.  
Nevertheless, in Imperiosus’ dictatorship we see a redefining of the office.  It was to be used for 
a civic function.  His dictatorship was new, and its competence was restricted to the religious 
ritual of driving the nail.   
 
Dictators as Consular Replacements 
Perhaps the most lucid indication that the earliest form of the Roman dictatorship was 
equivalent to the consulship can be derived from two dictatorships in the fourth century.  In the 
years 362 and 340 a dictator was appointed to replace a consul.  The consular fasti register each 
appointment as rei gerundae causa, which is logical given their military competences.  Livy’s 
narrative on these two dictatorships expounds their roles further.   
During the year after the controversial dictatorship of Imperiosus in 363, the Romans 
launched a campaign against the Hernici.  The consul L. Genucius Aventinensis, however, led 
the Roman army into an ambush where he was among numerous Roman casualties.  Livy offers 
no record of the activities of the other consul for that year, Q. Servilius Ahala (7.4.1-7.8.7).  It is 
plausible to suppose that he remained vigilant against the Gallic threat that had emerged south of 
                                                 
127.  Livy 7.3.  
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Rome a few years earlier.128  At any rate, the death of the consul Genucius prompted the 
appointment of Appius Claudius Regillensis as dictator.  Appius levied fresh troops and marched 
south to take command of the remnants of Genucius’ army.  The dictator resumed the consul’s 
campaign and earned a bloody victory over the army of the Hernici.   
In 340, the Romans were engaged in the second year of their final military confrontation 
against the united communities of Latium, the so-called Latin War.  During the principal battle 
of that year, fought somewhere around the slopes of Mount Vesuvius, the consul P. Decius Mus 
had devoted himself.  According to Livy’s version, after the subsequent Roman victory, the other 
consul T. Manlius Torquatus executed the remainder of his term without a colleague.  Soon 
thereafter, an army from the city of Antium, one of the rebellious Latin peoples, conducted a 
series of raids on Roman-allied cities along the Tyrrhenian coast (Livy 8.12.1-16).  Torquatus, 
however, fell ill and could not conduct the campaign.  In response, L. Papirius Crassus was 
appointed dictator to conduct the Roman effort against the Antiates.  This dictatorship can be 
interpreted two ways.  First, it may be an unambiguous example of a dictator acting as a 
replacement consul, a function that was relegated to a consul suffectus later in the Republic.129  
While Livy’s account gives no indication of when Crassus abdicated his post as dictator, it is 
plausible that he remained as a colleague to Torquatus after defeating the Antiates.  After all, for 
a consul to hold office without a colleague was to be unprecedented until the first century.  The 
second possibility is that Crassus’ dictatorship is yet another example of an ad hoc dictatorial 
appointment for a specific military task. 
 
Dictatorships in the Second Samnite War 
Finally, let us turn our attention to Roman usage of the dictatorship during the Second 
                                                 
128.  Livy 7.1.3.  
129.  Brennan 2000a: 71, 275 n. 76; cf. Brennan 2000b: 656-657 on praetorian replacements. 
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Samnite War, fought 327-304.  In this war, we can observe the culmination of my revised model 
of the dictatorship.  During the course of the more than twenty-year war, the Romans employed 
the dictatorship seventeen times for an array of consular activities.  Each of these dictatorships 
was necessary only because the consuls were either engaged in the field and could not manage 
certain domestic affairs or were unable to confront all Rome’s enemies at a given time.  In this 
war, the fully developed system of using the dictatorship as an ad hoc, consular magistracy 
reached its peak.  No such concentration of dictatorships within a similar timeframe would occur 
again.  As we shall see in the next chapter, dictatorial usage underwent a change after the end of 
the Second Samnite War.  An examination of four years in which the dictatorship was employed 
will suffice to understand use of the office in this war. 
Livy records that in 322 the Samnites levied an immense army and launched a renewed 
effort in the Second Samnite War (8.38.1).  He cites one tradition according to which the 
Romans appointed Aulus Cornelius Cossus as dictator rei gerundae causa, who took command 
of the Roman forces sent to confront the Samnite army.  This version maintains that the dictator 
won a stunning victory and returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph.  Accordingly, the consuls 
for the year, Q. Fabius Maximus and L. Fulvius Curvus, are assigned no specific tasks.  In fact, 
Livy omits any mention of their role in the military events of the year.  At the end of his 
discussion of events of 322, he notes an alternative tradition that attributes the great victory over 
the Samnites to the combined generalship of the consuls (8.40.1).  This record of events places 
the dictator Cossus in charge of the more mundane ludi Romani.  Appian, writing more than a 
century after Livy, may support this version of the campaign (Sam. 4.1-5).  While he does not 
clarify who led the campaign, Appian maintains that the Romans not only won a major battle 
over the Samnites, but that they captured an incredible eighty-one towns allied with the Samnites.  
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It would be impressive, indeed, for a single army under the command of a dictator to accomplish 
such a feat during a six-month period.  If some of the towns had come voluntarily under Roman 
control, the large number of captured towns would be more believable.  Appian’s language, 
however, implies military action (Sam. 4.1): 
ὅτι Σαυνῖται ἐς τὴν Φρεγελλανῶν ἐμβαλόντες ἐπόρθουν, Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ Σαυνιτῶν καὶ Δαυνίων 
ὀγδοήκοντα κώμας καὶ μίαν εἷλον καὶ ἄνδρας ἐξ αὐτῶν χιλίους καὶ δισμυρίους ἀνελόντες ἀπανέστησαν 
αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Φρεγέλλης.130 
 
While the Samnites were attacking and destroying the land of Fregellae, the Romans captured eighty-one 
Samnite and Daunian towns, seizing 21,000 men and driving them from the territory of Fregellae. 
 
Instead of a single commander undertaking such a wide-spread Roman offensive, it is 
likely that the consuls also campaigned in 322, with the dictator as a third colleague.  The 
consular fasti, on the other hand, are unequivocal about the dictator’s role in that year.  Cossus is 
listed as dictator ludorum Romanorum causa (for the purpose of holding the Roman games).  
Furthermore, the fasti triumphales assign triumphs in 322 to the consul Fulvius for victories over 
the Samnites and to the consul Fabius for victories over the Samnites and Apulians.  At any rate, 
Livy’s account of sole dictatorial command in 322 remains doubtful.  Whether the dictator was a 
consular colleague or only director of games, his status was no greater than that of a consul. 
The second example comes from 320, the year following the humiliating capture of a 
Roman army by the Samnites at the Caudine Forks.  This year is particularly interesting because 
the Romans appointed three different dictators.  The consular election for the year brought to 
power L. Papirius Cursor and Q. Publilius Philo.  After the senate engineered a way for the 
Romans to break the truce that had been agreed upon with the Samnites in 321, the consuls drew 
lots for their provinces and each positioned their armies on different fronts.  Papirius marched 
                                                 
130.  Another reading of the participle ἀνελόντες could imply that the Romans killed 21,000 Samnites and 
Daunians.  See LSJ: 106.  This reading, however, makes ambiguous whom the Romans drove from Fregellae, 
indicated by αὐτοὺς.  At any rate, Appian’s account stresses intense military activity. 
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southward into Apulia, and Publilius was stationed near the Campanian-Samnite border.  Livy 
recounts that Publilius won a victory over the Samnites and then joined his colleague Papirius in 
the successful siege of the Apulian city of Luceria, which had allowed a Samnite garrison to 
fortify it.  Livy preserves a separate tradition according to which Papirius actually won this 
victory over Luceria as magister equitum in 320, serving under the dictator L. Cornelius Lentulus.  
The consular fasti, as confused as Livy in this instance, record Papirius as both a consul and 
magister equitum in this year.  If he had been magister equitum, why would he have received 
credit for a victory instead of the dictator?  To complicate matters even further, the consular fasti 
record a second dictator rei gerundae causa for 320, T. Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus.  
Broughton suggests that he was likely meant to supervise the election of consuls for the 
following year.131   
The puzzling record of offices can likely never be sorted out precisely.  Nevertheless, we 
can draw broad conclusions from the information at our disposal.  First, Papirius as consul makes 
perfect sense.  He was one of the greatest Roman military commanders of the fourth century, 
being appointed dictator rei gerundae causa on four occasions.132  The Romans clearly favored 
keeping this general in command of an army, and his record in the war supports Roman 
confidence in his talent.  In fact, even his co-consul Publilius was an outstanding commander.  
Livy registers their election in this way: is consules creavit Q. Publilium Philonem et L. 
Papirium Cursorem iterum haud dubio consensu civitatis, quod nulli ea tempestate duces 
clariores essent (He oversaw the election of the consuls Q. Publilius Philo and L. Papirius 
Cursor, for the second time, without a doubt by the consensus of the city, because at that time no 
commanders were more renowned, 9.7.15).  It is thus difficult to understand why the Romans 
                                                 
              131.  Broughton 1951a: 153.   
132.  The consular fasti register Papirius as dictator in 340, 325, 324, and 309. 
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would have chosen to prosecute the war by first replacing these outstanding commanders with a 
dictator, not to mention in the year following the Romans’ greatest setback of the war.  It makes 
better sense to interpret the magisterial arrangements of 320 as two consuls, one of whom was 
the greatest Roman general available, leading the primary thrust of the Roman effort, supported 
on two occasions by supplemental dictators rei gerundae causa.  We can add to the unlikelihood 
of Papirius’ role as magister equitum the obvious fact that if the Romans wanted to ensure his 
leadership they would have ensured his appointment as dictator.  It is at least clear that the consul 
Publilius conducted an independent campaign in Campania and that Papirius played a major role 
in the Apulia campaign.  If Papirius was a consul, as listed in the consular fasti, then the dictator 
Lentulus’ appointment must have been for a civic function or a different campaign.  If Papirius 
was magister equitum to the dictator Lentulus, also alleged in the consular fasti, we have an 
indication that consuls and dictators were operating independently on different fronts. 
Apart from the confusion in the sources over the role of Papirius and the aforementioned 
dictatorship of T. Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus, ostensibly intended for electoral duty, Livy and 
the consular fasti agree that C. Maenius was appointed dictator.  The entry for his causa in the 
consular fasti has been worn away, but Livy insists that he was appointed to investigate anti-
Roman sentiment among Roman-allied cities in Campania.  In the end, he was unable to defend 
his conclusions about potential dissenters because his post was undermined by a group of 
powerful Roman aristocrats (Livy 9.26.1-22).  Nonetheless, his dictatorship, perhaps the third of 
the year 320, demonstrates how liberally the Romans were utilizing the office in this period.  
Finally, Livy makes one further notable comment on this year of the Second Samnite War: 
convenit iam inde per consules reliqua belli perfecta (It happened then that the remainder of the 
war was completed by the consuls, 9.16.1).  The consular fasti register nine additional dictatorial 
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appointments for the remaining years of the war, and all but one of these is assigned the 
competence rei gerundae causa.  If Livy’s comment can be taken as relevant, perhaps he means 
that consuls were thereafter, as we have observed all along, the primary military commanders for 
the prosecution of the war with the Samnites.  Under such a reconstruction, we can see explicitly 
that the eight dictators rei gerundae causa in the period 319-304 were appointed as ad hoc 
military commanders to supplement the consuls in the field.  The last two dictatorships to be 
discussed here will confirm such usage. 
Our third and final example of dictatorships in the Second Samnite War comes from the 
year 312, when M. Valerius Maximus and P. Decius Mus served as consuls.  Livy’s account has 
Valerius marching into Samnium to press the Roman advantage against the remaining Samnite 
resistance (9.29.3).  The fasti triumphales record a triumph for Valerius over the Samnites and 
Sorani.  Livy also recalls the emergence of an Etruscan army in southern Etruria.  At this point in 
the events of 312, inconsistencies arise in our sources.  Livy’s version maintains that Decius fell 
ill and was unable to lead Roman troops to confront the Etruscan threat.  In response, he 
appointed C. Sulpicius Longus as dictator, recorded in the consular fasti as rei gerundae causa.  
The dictator subsequently marched north only to find that the Etruscan army had withdrawn.  
Sulpicius’ dictatorship could, therefore, also be classified under our examples of dictatorships for 
consular replacement, according to this version of the events of 312.  Conversely, Broughton 
points to a single record of a triumph over the Samnites attributed to the consul Decius in 312.133  
What is more, Diodorus tells us that the Romans were also engaged against the Marrucini in 312, 
whose territory was located far to the east of Rome (19.105.5).134  This implies three disparate 
fronts facing the Romans in this year: Samnium, Etruria, Marrucinian territory.  If the reference 
                                                 
133.  Broughton 1951a: 159.  
134.  The location of Pollitium is unknown, Oakley 2005: 346. 
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to a triumph for the consul Decius is accurate but its author only misinterpreted the enemy as the 
Samnites, it is plausible that Decius campaigned against the Marrucini.  Livy indicates that the 
war with the Samnites was drawing to a close and not meant to be particularly challenging.  Why, 
then, would both consuls have campaigned there and earned different triumphs?  The Etruscan 
threat, according to Livy’s presentation of events, appears to have been beyond the scope of 
Roman plans at the beginning of the year.  Valerius and Decius thus may have been in their 
respective military provinces of Samnium and Marrucinian territory.  When the Etruscan threat 
emerged, the appointment of the dictator Sulpicius was undertaken simply because the two 
consuls were unavailable.  The three separate fronts may have thus been managed by three 
equivalent magistrates.  Valerius’ role in this year, at least, is secure, supported both in Livy’s 
narrative and by the consular and triumphal fasti.  Either way we choose to understand Sulpicius’ 
dictatorship, moreover, his status in relation to the consuls is clear: he was a replacement or 
supplemental commander. 
Livy notes two other military developments for 312 or 311.  First, a restructuring in the 
selection of military tribunes was enacted (9.30.3).  The populus Romanus, through a voting 
procedure, was now entitled to elect some of the military tribunes.  Livy is so concerned with 
explaining popular participation in military matters that he fails to realize that this transformation 
indicates an expansion of the military tribunate intended to meet expanding annual Roman 
military commitments.135  Second, the Romans also created a two-man naval command for the 
first time (...duumviros navales classis ornandae reficiendaeque causa, 9.30.4).  This indicates 
that the Roman military organization was expanding to meet the widening scope of war with the 
Samnites and other Italic peoples.  Within this increased period of military activity, the need for 
                                                 
135.  For an extensive analysis of the expanding Roman military presence in Italy during the last decade of 
the fourth century, see Oakley 2005: 342-645. 
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additional consular-level military commanders was critical.  Dictators, as we have seen, had been 
historically the officers of choice to fill these roles, but after the Second Samnite War they would 
be no longer.136 
 
Conclusion 
The outcome of analyzing the dictatorships put forth in this chapter reinforces the 
argument that early dictators were consular in nature and served as collegiate magistrates.  When 
understood within the framework constructed in previous chapters, all of the dictatorships 
discussed here are neatly aligned with this revised model of early Roman dictatorial usage.  The 
evidence in our sources – both literary and epigraphic – supports this model.  It remains to 
examine what inspired the accounts of later Roman authors who portrayed the dictatorship as a 
supremely powerful office.  To this end, I shall use the final chapter to draw conclusions about 
post-300 usage of the Roman dictatorship and offer suggestions about the later, Sullan, form of 
the office. 
                                                 
136.  The development of the praetorship will be discussed in Chapter Five.   
76 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION: HOW SULLA TRANSFORMED THE DICTATORSHIP 
 
The revised model of the early Roman dictatorship reconstructed in this thesis challenges 
traditional views of the institution.  I have argued that authors of the late Republic, such as Livy 
and Dionysius, are inconsistent in their portrayal of dictatorships in the period 501-300.  In 
describing the dictatorship as an institution, later writers relied upon an a priori notion of the 
supremacy of the office.  In contrast, the details of their narratives describing individual 
dictatorships in action betray a different function for the office.  When evidence from the 
consular and triumphal fasti and epigraphic and literary evidence from other Latin cities are 
introduced into the analysis, the picture of the dictatorship as a supremely powerful office 
collapses.  Instead, we see a dictatorship that was employed to complement the pair of consuls, 
primarily in military duties but also in domestic tasks.  Consuls and dictators, moreover, wielded 
an equivalent level of imperium.  It remains, then, to answer a fundamental question: what 
factors prompted later authors to believe that the dictatorship was an all-powerful office?  It is 
this question that I intend to address in this final chapter.  Additionally, I seek to end my analysis 
of the early dictatorship by noting the factors that contributed to the decline in use of the 
dictatorship in its early Republican form. 
The scope of my study of the Roman dictatorship ends in 300.  This is not an arbitrary 
date.  The last three decades of the fourth century saw the most concentrated use of the 
dictatorship in Republican history.  The intensity of dictatorial usage is not surprising when we 
consider that the period was characterized by the Second Samnite War, the most difficult 
extended conflict to date for the Romans, and one that stretched Rome’s military resources and 
magisterial structure to their limits.  In the third century the Romans continued to use the 
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dictatorship, but the office was employed far less frequently than in the previous two centuries.  
The consular fasti register only eighteen dictatorships in the third century, and eight of these 
appear during the years of the hard-fought Second Punic War.  Even more important than 
infrequent usage, the causae for third-century dictators reveals a further change in use of the 
office.  Outside of the war with Hannibal, only one of ten dictators carried the military function 
rei gerundae causa (249), and this dictator, just as in previous centuries, was intended to 
supplement the campaigns of that year’s consuls.137  In short, this dictatorship with a military 
focus recalls typical usage from the early Republic and makes perfect sense within the context of 
a renewed thrust by the Roman polity in the First Punic War.   
The earliest clear indication of a shift in Roman use of the dictatorship can be detected in 
295, the year of the campaign that resulted in the seminal battle of Sentinum.138  The Roman 
magisterial structure of this year, in which eight men held imperium, deserves a close study.  The 
consular fasti record that Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus and P. Decius Mus were consuls for the 
year.  One of the consuls of the previous year had reported to the senate that a wide array of 
enemies was amassed against Rome, including contingents of Etruscans, Samnites, Umbrians, 
and Gauls.  The other consul, Lucius Volumnius, having returned to Rome to hold elections for 
the following year, urged the people to elect Fabius as one of the consuls, since he was 
universally recognized as the most talented military man available.  Livy suggests that the consul 
even considered naming Fabius dictator were he not elected, thereby ensuring that Fabius had a 
command in the upcoming campaign (10.21.13-15):  
ob haec et – iam appetebat tempus – comitiorum causa L. Volumnius consul Romam reuocatus; qui 
priusquam ad suffragium centurias uocaret, in contionem aduocato populo multa de magnitudine belli 
Etrusci disseruit...se, nisi confideret eum consensu populi Romani consulem declaratum iri qui haud dubie 
tum primus omnium ductor habeatur, dictatorem fuisse extemplo dicturum. 
                                                 
137.  Polybius narrates the Drepanum campaign of 249, where it is clear that both consuls maintained 
separate commands, 1.46-1.56; Walbank 1957: 108-121. 
138.  Cornell 2001: 359-363.  
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On account of these things, as the time was demanding, the consul L. Volumnius was recalled to Rome for 
the purpose of supervising the comitia [centuriata]. He, before he called the centuries to vote, spoke in a 
contio before an assemblage of the people about the great extent of the Etruscan war...[He said that] unless 
he believed that the man who was without a doubt considered at that time to be the best leader of all was 
elected as consul by the consent of the Roman people, he would appoint this man dictator. 
 
Viewed by the traditional model of the dictatorship, this potential appointment could be 
used as evidence that the dictatorship was a supreme office.  This is not essential here.  Instead, 
and in line with the dictatorial model that I have established thus far, we may interpret Livy’s 
comment as a further indication that the dictatorship could still serve as an ad hoc military 
command.  In short, even if Fabius were not elected to the consulship, he would acquire a 
command in the upcoming, multi-front war by means of the dictatorship.  In the end, Fabius was 
elected consul.  More puzzling is the fact that imperium and commands were distributed to six 
other men, none of whom was appointed dictator.  This shift away from appointing dictators is 
significant, as even Livy appears to be pondering the development in his story about the consul 
Volumnius’ intentions.  In other words, in his narrative of Republican history to this point, Livy 
has recorded dictatorships all along.  As we saw in the Second Samnite War, he noted over a 
dozen dictatorships for various ad hoc functions.  Livy himself thus seems to expect that a 
dictator would be appointed for the campaigns of 295, and the fact that he speculates on 
Volumnius’ intentions confronts this issue.  Without actually perceiving the shift in Rome’s 
magisterial structure, then, Livy offers a clue to this change.139  One answer to why no dictator 
was appointed in 295 may be the rise of the praetorship, which was coeval with the decline in the 
use of the dictatorship.  Let us turn our attention to this institution. 
                                                 
139.  Livy reports that the consuls decided to elect praetors at the outset of the year, ostensibly for manning 
the court system and the city while the consuls were out on campaign (10.22.1-9).  Equally, the consuls and the 
senate might have been so aware of the magnitude of the upcoming campaign – we here that reports were arriving 
daily about the gathering coalition against Rome (10.21.1-15) – that they decided to elect magistrates at the outset of 
the year, perceiving that they would be of use.  In contrast, the dictatorship was generally appointed ad hoc, after the 
events of the year were underway.  Perhaps this is one reason why we see praetors instead of dictators in 295.  
Moreover, prorogation of praetors from the previous year was used instead of dictatorial appointment.  See Brennan 
2000a: 75-77.  
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The Rise of the Praetorship 
In the Roman magisterial array for the Sentinum campaign of 295, praetors play a 
principal role for the first time.  Four of the six magistrates appointed to accompany the consuls 
were designated as pro-praetors, clearly appointed once the year was already underway, another 
man was elected praetor at the outset of the year, and the sixth was a prorogued consul from 296, 
whose authority clearly resembled that of the praetors.  Brennan offers a cogent reconstruction of 
the rise of the praetorship, along with increased usage of prorogation and special praetorian-level 
commands.140  One of his explanations for the shift from appointment of what I would designate 
‘ad hoc’ dictators to praetors is that the senate grew reluctant to employ dictators, whose 
authority, according to his notion of the office, surpassed all other magistracies.141  In fact, the 
senate did not stop advocating the use of dictators but rather adapted its application of the office 
and established it as a domestic office. 
From 300 to the outbreak of the Second Punic War, eleven dictatorships appear in the 
consular fasti and all but one were denoted dictatorships for holding elections, driving a nail into 
the temple of Jupiter, supervising the important sacrifices, or handling the passage of major 
legislation.142  These uses fall very much into line with many dictatorships domi of the period 
501-300.  Noticeably absent are dictatorships with a military or consular-level domestic purpose.  
As noted above, the single dictatorship rei gerundae causa occurred in 249, during a renewed 
Roman push in the First Punic War.  Instead, the dictatorship appears to have become a 
standardized domi magistracy.  There is a good explanation for this change.  For each domestic 
function, a dictator’s consular-level imperium and auspicia were required.  As we have seen in 
previous chapters, only a consul or dictator was capable of convening the comitia centuriata, 
                                                 
140.  See Brennan 2000a: 75-97 for use of the praetorship down to the Second Punic War. 
141.  Ibid., 75. 
142.  See Appendix Two for dictatorial usage in the third century. 
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driving the sacred clavus to ward off pestilence, conducting feriae Latinae on the Alban Hill, and 
supervising the passage of an important piece of legislation in the comitia.  It is this type of 
domestic purpose that dominated use of the office in the third century, while the praetorship 
became the tool of choice to fill the role of supplementing consuls militarily.  In this respect, 
then, the praetorship and dictatorship complemented one another.  With this new military 
responsibility, moreover, the praetorship appears to be equivalent to the dictatorship, whose 
military role it subsumed.  Perhaps this development should be viewed as a change in jurisdiction, 
rather than an instance in which one office supplants the other entirely. 
 
Polybius and the Dictatorship 
Polybius composed his account of Roman history and institutions in the 160s and 150s.  
We have already seen his characterization of the dictatorship, but it will be useful to reintroduce 
the passage here in its full form.  He explains the office in this way (3.87.6-9): 
Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ δικτάτορα μὲν κατέστησαν Κόιντον Φάβιον, ἄνδρα καὶ φρονήσει διαφέροντα καὶ πεφυκότα 
καλῶς. ἔτι γοῦν ἐπεκαλοῦντο καὶ καθ’ ἡμᾶς οἱ ταύτης τῆς οἰκίας Μάξιμοι, τοῦτο δ’ ἔστι μέγιστοι, διὰ 
τὰς ἐκείνου τἀνδρὸς ἐπιτυχίας καὶ πράξεις. ὁ δὲ δικτάτωρ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑπάτων· τῶν 
μὲν γὰρ ὑπάτων ἑκατέρῳ δώδεκα πελέκεις ἀκολουθοῦσι, τούτῳ δ’ εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρες, κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν 
πολλοῖς προσδέονται τῆς συγκλήτου πρὸς τὸ συντελεῖν τὰς ἐπιβολάς, οὗτος δ’ ἔστιν αὐτοκράτωρ 
στρατηγός, οὗ κατασταθέντος παραχρῆμα διαλύεσθαι συμβαίνει πάσας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ πλὴν 
τῶν δημάρχων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις ἀκριβεστέραν ποιησόμεθα τὴν διαστολήν. ἅμα 
δὲ τῷ δικτάτορι κατέστησαν ἱππάρχην Μάρκον Μινύκιον. οὗτος δὲ τέτακται μὲν ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτοκράτορα, 
γίνεται δ’ οἱονεὶ διάδοχος τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου περισπασμοῖς. 
  
The Roman appointed Quintus Fabius dictator, a man excelling in his wisdom and naturally beautiful. At 
any rate, those of his house [the gens Fabia] are still called in our time Maximi, that is, ‘the Greatest,’ 
because of the successes and accomplishments of that man. The dictator has these distinctions from the 
consuls: twelve lictors accompany each of the consuls, but twenty-four accompany the dictator; the consuls 
(κἀκεῖνοι) are very much bound to the senate in making decisions, but the dictator (οὗτος) is an 
autonomous commander, and when he is appointed, it happens immediately that all magistracies in Rome 
except the plebeian tribunate are dissolved. Nevertheless, I shall give more precise details about these 
things at another time. Along with the dictator, they appointed Marcus Minucius magister equitum. He was 
appointed to serve under the autonomous [dictator] but he became as if the successor to the dictatorship 
(τῆς ἀρχῆς) in the event of a delay of the dictator (ἐκείνου). 
 
This dictatorial appointment was made in 217, just after the Roman defeat at Lake Trasimene.  
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Polybius’ insistence that dictators wielded greater imperium than consuls remains the most 
problematic contradiction to the model of the early dictatorship being constructed in this thesis.  
Specifically, he maintains that twenty-four lictors accompanied a dictator, traditionally 
interpreted as an indication that a dictator’s imperium was twice that of consuls.143  His 
characterization of the dictatorship is given substantial weight, since his work contains the 
earliest extant literary analysis of the office.  Even so, it is possible to refute each point of 
Polybius’ portrayal with other evidence.  In fact, the pieces of evidence against Polybius, 
although written later, are relatively numerous.  As we shall see, there is good reason not to 
dismiss these later references out of hand.  Most of these authors approach the subject of Roman 
magistracy with a much clearer understanding of Roman institutions than Polybius did. 
 To begin with, one can read Polybius’ narrative here as an encomium for the gens Fabia.  
Polybius’ close relationships with Roman elite families have been well documented.144  In 
particular, he remained on friendly terms with Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, an adopted son 
of the gens Fabia.  Polybius himself offers a glimpse of this friendship in 31.23.1-12.  The praise 
of the abilities and character of Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus in 3.87.6-9 give context to this 
entire passage.  If Polybius is correct that Fabius enjoyed such respect, perhaps Roman 
adherence to his plans may be the product of this respect rather than supreme imperium as 
dictator. 
 The content of Polybius’ brief characterization of the dictatorship also contains errors.  
First of all, Walbank points out that Polybius was incorrect that Q. Fabius Verrucosus obtained 
the cognomen Maximus.  Instead, a Fabius received this appellation a century before, during the 
                                                 
143.  Cic. Leg. 3.9.  
144.  For the relationship between Polybius and Scipio, see Vell. Pat. 1.13.3; Walbank 1957: 3 and 1972: 8-
9. 
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Second Samnite War.145  The second mistake in Polybius’ portrayal is his insistence that all 
magistracies except the plebeian tribunes were dissolved when a dictator was appointed (3.87.8: 
οὗ κατασταθέντος παραχρῆμα διαλύεσθαι συμβαίνει πάσας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ πλὴν τῶν 
δημάρχων).  As has been noted in examples throughout this thesis, the consuls remained in 
office, alongside dictators.146 
 At the end of his brief discussion of the dictatorship, Polybius says that he will take up 
the office in more detail later (3.87.9: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις ἀκριβεστέραν 
ποιησόμεθα τὴν διαστολήν).147  This more thorough discussion never appears in what has 
survived of Polybius’ work.  One possible explanation is that the discussion occurred in one of 
the many lost sections of Polybius’ text.148  Another logical place for this discussion would have 
been Polybius’ analysis of the Roman constitution (6.11.1-6.18.9).  In this section, he outlines 
the tripartite character of the Roman system: the polity was balanced by the power of the consuls, 
the senate, and the people.  Reference to the dictator, however, is absent.  The final possibility of 
where this discussion of the dictatorship could have taken place would be shortly after 3.87.  At 
3.103.1-8, Polybius describes a puzzling development during Fabius’ dictatorship of 217.  M. 
Minucius served as Fabius’ magister equitum, and after Hannibal escaped from the dictator a 
number of times, the Roman people clamored for Minucius to be given command.149  Polybius 
goes on to record that the Romans conferred on Minucius authority equal to that of the dictator 
(3.103.4-5):     
 
                                                 
145.  Walbank 1957: 422.  The consular fasti attest to the cognomen Maximus for Q. Fabius Rullianus, 
dictator in 315. 
146.  See also Mommsen 1887: 2.155 n. 4; Liebenam 1905: 382-383; and Walbank 1957: 422. 
147.  Walbank 1957: 422; von Fritz 1954: 469-470. 
148.  Walbank 1957: 422 and 1972: 13-19.  
149.  Polyb. 3.94; Walbank 1957: 430.  
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αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ κἀκεῖνον κατέστησαν, πεπεισμένοι ταχέως αὐτὸν τέλος ἐπιθήσειν  
τοῖς πράγμασι· καὶ δὴ δύο δικτάτορες ἐγεγόνεισαν ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις, ὃ πρότερον  
οὐδέποτε συνεβεβήκει παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις,  
 
For, they made that man an autonomous magistrate, convinced that he would bring an end to matters 
quickly. And, in fact, there were two dictators for the same tasks, which had never before occurred  
among the Romans. 
 
This passage is problematic.  Polybius insists that this move to make dictator and magister 
equitum equal partners was unprecedented, not to mention the appointment of two dictators for 
the same task.  He may well be correct in this, if the magisterial relationship between Fabius and 
Minucius was dictator-magister equitum.  Livy explains that the comitia centuriata elected both 
men to their positions, since the consuls were not present to make the appointment (22.8.5-6).  
Mommsen attempted to make sense of this confusing situation by suggesting that both men were 
actually praetors rather than dictator and magister equitum, a solution that would explain the fact 
that they were elected, individually, rather than appointed.150  If Polybius was correct that the 
magister equitum was given dictatorial imperium, his narrative of 3.103 undercuts the supremacy 
of the very same dictatorship that he uses as his paradigm of the office in 3.87.  For this reason, 
perhaps, Polybius decided not to undertake a more detailed analysis of the dictatorship, seeing 
that his prime example was itself contradictory. 
 The most difficult part of Polybius’ model of dictatorship to reconcile with my revised 
model of the office is his reference to twenty-four dictatorial lictors (3.87.7-8: ὁ δὲ δικτάτωρ 
ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑπάτων· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπάτων ἑκατέρῳ δώδεκα πελέκεις 
ἀκολουθοῦσι, τούτῳ δ’ εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρες).151  This is the single allusion to dictators 
possessing extra lictors before Sulla in an account written before Sulla’s dictatorship in 82.  Livy 
Per. 89 records: Sulla dictator factus, quod nemo umquam fecerat, cum fascibus XXIIII processit 
                                                 
150.  Mommsen 1887: 2.147 n. 4.  Both the dictator and magister equitum were elected in the comitia 
centuriata (Livy 22.8.6; Plut. Fab. 4-5; App. Hann. 11-12; Dio fg. 57.8; Zon. 8.25). 
151.  Brennan 2000a: 42-43.  
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(Sulla, after he was made dictator, went forth with twenty-four fasces, which no one had ever 
done before).  Most scholars agree that the Periochae are faithful in recording facts from Livy’s 
original narrative.152  To cite a single example, Per. 22 confirms an important detail of 
Hannibal’s strategy in 217 that also appears in Livy’s extant text (22.23.4).  Both texts maintain 
that Hannibal attempted to undermine Roman confidence in the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus by 
leaving the dictator’s land untouched during raids, thereby making the Romans believe that 
Fabius was collaborating with the enemy.  So, we can be relatively certain that Livy, whose 
understanding of Roman magistracy in the late Republic was better than that of most authors, 
wrote that Sulla was the first to go about accompanied by twenty-four lictors.  Appian maintains 
that among the other unprecedented aspects of Sulla’s dictatorship was his introduction of 
twenty-four dictatorial lictors (BC 1.99-100).  Cassius Dio, recording events of the early 
principate of Augustus, writes that the Roman people offered twenty-four lictors to Augustus 
when they tried to make him dictator in 19 (54.1).  Dio was likely following post-Sullan 
dictatorial perceptions (see below).  Two references to twenty-four lictors, found in Dionysius 
(Ant. Rom. 10.24.2) and Plutarch (Fab. 4.3), claim that dictators in the early Republic possessed 
twenty-four lictors.153  Both authors wrote after Sulla’s unprecedented dictatorship, and both may 
have followed Polybius’ remark in 3.87.  Mommsen proposed to resolve this controversy by 
suggesting that dictators had twenty-four lictors in the field but only twelve in the city during the 
early Republic, and that Sulla was thus the first dictator to have twenty-four within the city.154  If 
Mommsen was correct, then Polybius might have misinterpreted the character of the dictatorship 
rei gerundae causa for a military purpose for all dictatorships, including those implemented for 
                                                 
152.  Begbie 1967: 332-338; Walsh 1996: 7-8; Conte 1999: 647; Chaplin 2007: xxiii-xxiv; Chaplin and 
Kraus 2009: 97; Levene 2007: 277; and Pittenger 2008: 7 n. 16.  
153.  Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 10.24.  Livy mentions lictors but does not specify the number employed (3.26). 
154.  Mommsen 1887: 2.155. 
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domi functions.  As we have already seen, dictatorial imperium militiae was absolute, just like 
consular imperium militiae.  Finally, Livy records that Romulus had only twelve lictors as king 
(1.8.3).  To Livy, then, twenty-four lictors for a dictator would have made little sense. 
 How do we decide which accounts to follow?  Preference for Polybius would be based 
upon the fact that his is the earlier account.  Nevertheless, as Walbank points out, even Polybius 
was writing a full generation after the original form of the dictatorship disappeared after 202.  
Consequently, he never observed the office in person.  We may thus place him on a nearly equal 
status with our post-Sullan sources on the dictatorship.155  Finally, we have seen that Polybius’ 
account of the dictatorship is erroneous on every other point.  Is it logical, then, to believe that he 
is correct in the single instance that early Roman dictators possessed twenty-four lictors, the 
symbolic attestation that their imperium was twice as great as consular imperium?  The accounts 
of Livy and Appian, recording that Sulla was the first to introduce twenty-four dictatorial lictors, 
align more closely with the evidence assembled thus far in this thesis for the function of the early 
Roman dictatorship.  In this case, the references in Dionysius and Plutarch can be taken as 
influenced by Sulla’s unprecedented dictatorship.  Let us now turn our attention to Sulla. 
 
The Dictatorship of Sulla 
The dictatorship of Sulla loomed over all subsequent Roman perceptions of the office.  In 
his assessment of the Roman institution of dictator, Dionysius declares that Romans were 
apathetic toward use of the office throughout the Republic.  It was only when Sulla took up the 
dictatorship, he continues, that Romans saw the office as a dangerous and maligned institution 
(Ant. Rom. 5.77.4): 
ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν ἡλικίας ὁμοῦ τι τετρακοσίων διαγενομένων ἐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Τίτου 
Λαρκίου δικτατορίας διεβλήθη καὶ μισητὸν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἐφάνη τὸ πρᾶγμα Λευκίου Κορνηλίου 
                                                 
155.  Walbank (1957), 422. 
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Σύλλα πρώτου καὶ μόνου πικρῶς αὐτῇ καὶ ὠμῶς χρησαμένου· ὥστε τότε πρῶτον αἰσθέσθαι Ῥωμαίους, 
ὃ τὸν ἄλλον ἅπαντα χρόνον ἠγνόουν, ὅτι τυραννίς ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ δικτάτορος ἀρχή. 
 
In the time of our fathers, some four hundred years after the dictatorship of Titus Larcius, the office was 
misrepresented and became hated when Lucius Cornelius Sulla, for the first and only time, used it harshly 
and cruelly. The result was that the Romans understood for the first time what they did not know for the 
whole time before, that the office of dictator is a tyranny. 
 
Appian notes a similar popular sentiment, claiming that for the first time Sulla made the 
dictatorship an absolute tyranny: τότε δὲ πρῶτον ἐς ἀόριστον ἐλθοῦσα τυραννὶς ἐγίγνετο 
ἐντελής (Then, being unrestricted for the first time, [the dictatorship] became a full-fledged 
tyranny, BC 1.99).  These authors, perhaps simply commenting on the brutality of Sulla himself, 
preserve for us a genuine change in use of the dictatorship.  Any memory of the original function 
of the office was supplanted by the unrestricted form of dictatorship introduced by Sulla.  
Dionysius and Appian, along with Livy, wrote in the decades following Sulla’s new dictatorship.  
Consequently, it is impossible to read their portrayal of the office, including discussion of early 
Republican dictators, without noting Sullan influences.  The effects of Sulla’s office, as we have 
seen, are most noticeable in late Republican analyses of the institution of the dictatorship. 
My intent here is not to examine closely Sulla’s political activities during the late 80s and 
early 70s.  Instead, I seek to outline the general nature of his dictatorship.  In doing so, we may 
begin to see how his new form of dictatorship influenced commentators of his own time and 
thereafter.  Sulla brought to the dictatorship his own brutality and de facto supreme authority 
over the Roman polity.  In this way, he made the dictatorship supreme rather than being elevated 
to a supreme position via the dictatorship.  In short, Sulla made the office of dictator whatever he 
chose.  The only similarity with the original form was the title itself.  First of all, the consular 
fasti record a new causa for Sulla’s dictatorship in 82 – reipublicae constituendae causa (for the 
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purpose of establishing the Republic).156  This entry alone anticipates what literary sources 
confirm.  Sulla’s position was genuinely unrestricted.  Appian characterizes his power in this 
way: ὁ δὲ ἔργῳ βασιλεὺς ὢν ἢ τύραννος, οὐχ αἱρετός, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει καὶ βίᾳ (He was, in 
practice a king or tyrant, not by election but by force and violence, BC 1.98).  He was free to 
settle the Roman polity as he saw fit.  He passed a series of legislative measures that curbed the 
political power of ambitious magistrates and influential plebeian tribunes and placed more power 
back into the hands of the senate.157  A principal thrust of his legislation was to undercut the 
authority of the plebeian tribunes, whose power had become increasingly great over the past 
several decades.  Specifically, Sulla restricted the tribunes’ right of intercessio (and provocatio) 
and prohibited ex-tribunes from obtaining higher office, thereby making the post unattractive to 
aspiring politicians.158  The combination of his push to strengthen the senate and diminish the 
tribunate, the body that spoke ostensibly on behalf of the people, recalls the traditional notion in 
Livy and others that dictators were used to suppress the plebeian tribunes during the early 
Republic.159 
Perhaps the most significant innovation in Sulla’s version of the dictatorship was that he 
was the first dictator to hold office with no consuls.  In 82, he fought a series of wars in Italy 
against the sitting consuls for control of the Roman polity.  In separate battles, Sulla’s forces 
killed both consuls.  When he returned to Rome, he arranged for one of his political allies, a 
former consul named L. Valerius Flaccus, to become an interrex and name Sulla as dictator.  
Flaccus’ position as interrex, and the fact that he was a former consul, apparently made his 
auspicia sufficient to undertake the appointment.  In addition to his rule without consuls, Sulla 
                                                 
156.  Loewenstein 1973: 81-84; and Keaveney 2005: 135-136. 
157.  Gruen 1974: 23-24; R. Seager 1992: 172; Keaveney 2005: 56-57,112-113. 
158.  App. BC 1.100; Broughton 1951b: 66-85.  
159.  This sentiment is recorded throughout Livy, and the consular fasti record dictatorships seditionis 
sedendae causa for the years 494, 439, 385 (all three contain doubtful causae, see Hartfield 1982: 56-72), and 368. 
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held a string of four annual dictatorships, rather than being limited to six-month terms, from 82-
79.160  There were consuls in these years, and in one instance, Sulla held a consulship while 
being dictator.161  His role as dictator over a pair of consuls explains the late Republican notion 
that dictators supervised the activities of the consuls.  As Appian asserts, Sulla established a 
regime, and one of absolute rule.  Our understanding of Sulla’s position may also be clarified by 
numismatic evidence.  A gold aureus minted in 80 depicts Sulla in an equestrian pose and 
contains the inscription L. SULL. FELI DIC.162  Appian mentions that the senate voted for an 
equestrian statue of Sulla to be erected in front of the Rostra, and that may be what the coin 
portrays (BC 1.97).163  At any rate, Sulla appears to have been the first dictator to issue coinage, 
not to mention coinage with the title dictator inscribed.  This coin thus represents another feature 
of Sulla’s unrestricted dictatorship.  Finally, Appian recalls that Sulla’s authority was 
underscored by the fact that he went about the city with twenty-four lictors, just as kings had 
once done in early Rome (BC 1.100).  The context for this remark is a discussion of the 
extraordinary features of Sulla’s consulship.  Perhaps we are thus supposed to understand that 
Sulla was the first dictator to wield these symbols of power within the city itself. 
It is also important to note that in the decades following Sulla’s dictatorship, the senate 
and most Roman magistrates carefully avoided employing the office of dictator.  Surely, this can 
be attributed to the recent brutalities of Sulla’s office, such as suppression of the plebeians and 
the creation of proscription lists.164  For instance, Pompey held special authority on three 
occasions, but never took a dictatorship.  In 67, the lex Gabinia granted to Pompey unlimited 
imperium for three years to campaign against pirates in the eastern Mediterranean, and in the 
                                                 
160.  Broughton 1951b: 66-85.  
161.  App. BC 1.103.  
162.  Crawford 1974a: 82 (No. 381).  
163.  Keaveney 2005: 135, 212 n. 25.  
164.  Gruen 1974: 10-11, 36, 411-414.  
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following year the lex Manilia extended his command to include the war with king Mithridates 
of Pontus.165  In 52, during the chaos after the murder of P. Clodius Pulcher, the people clamored 
for Pompey to take control of the situation as either dictator or consul.  The senate, as recorded in 
that year’s entry in the consular fasti, gave Pompey a sole consulship instead.166 
The original version of dictatorship metamorphosed after the end of the third century.  
The consular fasti attest to a one hundred-twenty-year lapse before Sulla took up the office in a 
new form.  Furthermore, the final pre-Sullan dictatorship occurred in the very period in which 
Roman authors began composing literary accounts of their history and institutions.  
Consequently, the original form of the dictatorship would have been at least not wholly 
understood by, at most unknown by Romans of the first century.  One source of information on 
early magistracies for Romans of the late Republic was the consular and triumphal fasti.  
Assuming that the fasti that have survived preserve an accurate record of magistrates, how could 
a Roman of the first century conclude that the dictatorship was a supremely powerful office 
when he saw the frequency of its use, its often routine function, and such inconsistencies as a 
consul triumphing while a dictator was in office?  The answer seems to be clear – one could not 
have reached such a conclusion from epigraphic material alone.  Two examples from the late 
Republic and early Empire demonstrate that the populus Romanus, at least, still thought that the 
dictatorship functioned as an ad hoc magistracy, even in the face of its unprecedented use by 
Sulla.  As noted above, in the chaos that erupted over the murder of Clodius in 52 the people 
desired Pompey to be appointed dictator.  Dio reports that in 22, Augustus had laid down his 
consulship at approximately the same time as a grain shortage threatened Rome’s supply.  Dio 
                                                 
165.  Dio 36.14.4; 36.17.1; Plut. Pomp. 25.4; Gruen 1974: 64, 80, 131, 537-540.  Cicero delivered a speech 
in favor of the lex Manilia, in which there is no mention of a dictatorship. 
166.  Asc. Mil. 31; Plut. Cat. Min. 47.1-4; Syme 1960: 39; Broughton 1951b: 233-235; Millar 1998: 180-
187; Morstein-Marx 2004: 5. 
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maintains that the plebeians locked the senators inside the Curia and threatened to burn it down 
unless Augustus became dictator (54.1).167  The people’s primary aim in having Augustus as 
dictator was that he would also become grain monitor and solve the impending grain shortage 
crisis.  Both functions, had the men actually been appointed dictators, recall the causae that 
Romans could read on the consular fasti.  Even so, Sulla’s new dictatorship proved formative for 
Roman perceptions of the institution, and it was this perception that characterized the later 
literary accounts that have canonized our modern view of the dictatorship as a supremely 
powerful office.  
Caesar took his first dictatorship in 49 under the guise of comitiorum habendorum causa 
and feriarum Latinarum causa, according to the consular fasti.  Subsequently, he held five 
consecutive annual dictatorships, employing Sulla’s omnipotent designation as dictator 
reipublicae constituendae causa, and in 44, Caesar assumed the title dictator perpetuus.168  
Caesar’s dictatorships were not marked by the same brutalities as Sulla’s had been, but Caesar 
exercised even greater power than his predecessor.  Even so, the parameters of a dictatorship 
with unrestricted imperium and term limit were already established by Sulla.  In terms of late 
Republican perceptions of the dictatorship, Sulla’s office was formative, while Caesar’s office at 
most reaffirmed precedents established by Sulla.  Consequently, Sulla’s dictatorship remains the 
principal paradigm for late Republican commentators.  
 
 
                                                 
167.  Dio says that Augustus appointed men to supervise the grain supply and that he refused the 
dictatorship, knowing which the senate would respond negatively.  Dio also notes that Augustus did not see the need 
for a dictatorship, since his present position as princeps was already far greater.  Marc Antony had abolished the 
dictatorship in 44, so if Augustus had tried to assume the post, it would have been technically unconstitutional.  See 
Loewenstein 1973: 87-88. 
168.  Gelzer 1968: 320-321; Syme 1960: 50-56; Taylor 1964: 172-175; and Loewenstein 1973: 84-87.  
Numerous coins minted during Caesar’s reign contain the title dictator perpetuus.  For example, see Crawford 
1974a: 489 (BMCRR Rome 4157, denarius). 
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Conclusion 
 The original form of the Roman dictatorship, in which dictators served as ad hoc 
magistrates equivalent to and used to supplement consuls, accounts for nearly all the 
dictatorships listed in literary sources and registered in the consular fasti.  Even those dictators 
whose authority appears to be greater than that of the consuls can be reconciled.  For example, 
the dictatorship of L. Furius Camillus in 390 is commemorated in literary sources as a paradigm 
of how the institution was supposed to function.169  Even though Camillus’ actions come to the 
fore in narratives on the Roman recovery after the Gallic sack, the consuls remained in office, as 
listed in the year’s consular fasti.  It is a common trope in ancient historiography, in general, to 
attribute momentous deeds to single individuals.  Nevertheless, close analysis of such events 
often reveal the involvement of other important figures.170  Such venerated dictatorships as that 
of L. Quinctius Cincinnatus in 458, moreover, have been reconciled with my revised model in 
Chapter Four of this thesis. 
The evidence collected in this study of the early dictatorship has been interdisciplinary, 
including analyses of comparative data from other Italic dictatorships, epigraphic information, 
and the Roman concepts of auspicia and imperium.  The overall portrait of the early dictatorship 
constructed by this evidence diverges from the traditional picture of the dictatorship as a 
supremely powerful institution.  Contrary to the traditional viewpoint, ancient sources reveal 
numerous examples of the dictatorship as an ad hoc, consular-level magistracy, and very few 
examples that conform to an all-powerful model of the office.  Moreover, by tracing the impact 
that Sulla’s resurrected form of the dictatorship had on subsequent literary characterizations of 
the office, we have seen that the supreme aspects of the dictatorship, under its traditional model, 
                                                 
169.  Livy 5.43-55. 
170.  For example, Stewart 1998: 77-79. 
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do not correlate directly with the original form of the office from the early Republic.  Modern 
analyses of the Roman dictatorship have revolved around its origins, the constitutional aspects of 
the office, the meaning of its causae, and the late Republican versions undertaken by Sulla and 
Caesar.  Even within such a wide range of studies, further avenues of exploration of the 
dictatorship remain open.  The present study has offered a model of the early dictatorship that 
runs contrary to all traditional views, arguing that dictatorial auspicia and imperium were 
equivalent to consular auspicia and imperium rather than superior.  The inquiries undertaken 
here have provided a framework that can lead to further investigation of the original form and 
function of the Roman dictatorship in the first three centuries of the Republic. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
ROMAN USE OF THE DICTATORSHIP, 501-300 B.C. 
 
 
Year        Causa                         Year        Causa     
501        rei gerundae causa     349        comitiorum habendorum causa  
498        rei gerundae causa   348        comitiorum habendorum causa 
494        seditionis sedendae causa  345        rei gerundae causa 
458        rei gerundae causa   344        feriarum Latinarum causa 
439*        seditionis sedendae causa  342        rei gerundae causa 
437*        rei gerundae causa                 340        rei gerundae causa 
435*        rei gerundae causa               339        rei gerundae causa 
433*        rei gerundae causa              337        rei gerundae causa 
431*        rei gerundae causa             335        comitiorum habendorum causa 
426*        rei gerundae causa   334        rei gerundae causa 
418*        rei gerundae causa   332        rei gerundae causa 
408*        rei gerundae causa   331        clavi figendi causa 
396*        rei gerundae causa   327        comitiorum habendorum causa 
390*        rei gerundae causa   325        rei gerundae causa 
389*        rei gerundae causa   324‡        rei gerundae causa 
385*        seditionis sedendae causa  322        ludorum Romanorum causa 
380*        rei gerundae causa   321†        comitiorum habendorum causa 
368*†        rei gerundae causa /    320†      (1) exercendis quaestionibus causa 
              seditionis sedendae causa     (2) rei gerundae causa 
367*        rei gerundae causa   316        rei gerundae causa 
363        clavi figendi causa   315        rei gerundae causa 
362        rei gerundae causa   314        rei gerundae causa 
361        rei gerundae causa   313        rei gerundae causa 
360        rei gerundae causa   312        rei gerundae causa 
358        rei gerundae causa   309‡        rei gerundae causa 
356        rei gerundae causa   306        comitiorum habendorum causa 
353        rei gerundae causa   302        rei gerundae causa 
352        rei gerundae causa   301‡      (1) rei gerundae causa 
351        comitiorum habendorum causa     (2) rei gerundae causa 
350        comitiorum habendorum causa 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
†Year included a vitiated dictatorship. 
*Occurred during the period of the military tribunate. 
‡So-called ‘dictator years’ with no consuls recorded in the consular fasti. Livy, however, does not mention a break 
in the consulship during these years; see Oakley 1997: 104-105. Drummond 1978: 569-572 has shown that the 
‘dictator years’ were likely a post-Caesarian invention, inserted into the fasti to justify Caesar’s consecutive annual 
dictatorships. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
 
ROMAN USE OF THE DICTATORSHIP, 299-202 B.C. 
 
 
Year        Causa                         Year        Causa     
286        seditionis sedendae causa  216   (1) rei gerundae causa 
280        comitiorum habendorum causa     (2) senatorum legum causa 
276        [causa illegible]    213        comitiorum habendorum causa 
263        clavi figendi causa   210        comitiorum habendorum causa 
257        feriarum Latinarum causa  208        comitiorum habendorum causa / 
249†        rei gerundae causa          ludorum magnorum causa 
246        comitiorum habendorum causa  207        comitiorum habendorum causa 
231        comitiorum habendorum causa  205        comitiorum habendorum causa 
224        comitiorum habendorum causa  203        comitiorum habendorum causa 
221†        comitiorum habendorum causa  202        comitiorum habendorum causa 
217  (1) interregni causa 
 (2) comitiorum habendorum causa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
†Year included a vitiated dictatorship. 
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